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The Origins and Legacy  




 The overwhelming majority of the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment cases over the past fifty years have been resolved using a 
warrant-presumption model, which determines the constitutionality of 
a search or seizure by asking whether law enforcement officials had 
probable cause and a warrant, or some exception to those requirements. 
But three decisions, beginning in 2001, mysteriously deviated from that 
approach and applied a reasonableness-balancing model, upholding the 
searches in those cases after considering the totality of the 
circumstances and weighing the competing government interests 
against the defendant’s privacy interests. This balancing approach has 
justifiably been criticized as amorphous, subjective, and overly 
deferential to government. 
No announcement or explanation accompanied the Justices’ 
departure from the warrant-presumption model. In fact, the Court 
claimed that it was simply following its “general Fourth Amendment 
approach.”1 Some scholars likewise believe that the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence has reflected this balancing approach for 
decades. And other academics fear that the Court has now completely 
abandoned the warrant-presumption model and replaced it with the 
reasonableness-balancing model. 
This Article maintains that both of those claims are overstated. 
First, in exploring the origins of the reasonableness-balancing model, 
the Article concludes that, prior to 2001, balancing was largely limited 
to Fourth Amendment cases requiring the Court either to decide on the 
creation and scope of categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement 
or to rule on the constitutionality of administrative inspections. 
Although general language suggesting a wider role for the balancing 
test can be found in a few Supreme Court decisions, those opinions 
derived support for a balancing analysis exclusively from warrant-
presumption model cases, did not stray far from that model, or have 
 
†  Professor and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Penn State 
Law (University Park). I am indebted to Joshua Dressler, David Kaye, 
and George Thomas for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of 
this Article. 
1. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
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been undermined by later decisions. As a result, neither the Justices 
nor others have been able to find much in the way of precedent 
supporting an ad hoc balancing approach. 
Turning second to the legacy of the reasonableness-balancing 
model, the Article analyzes both Supreme Court and lower court 
decisions postdating the trilogy of opinions. This review finds that the 
Supreme Court has continued to apply the warrant-presumption model 
in almost every Fourth Amendment case other than the three outlier 
opinions. The record in the lower federal and state courts is more mixed, 
and some courts have arguably attempted to extend the reasonableness-
balancing model into a few limited contexts beyond those involved in 
the three Supreme Court decisions. In general, however, the lower 
courts have been reluctant to apply the reasonableness-balancing model 
aggressively and expand it into new arenas—with one exception, foreign 
intelligence and national security searches. Moreover, a number of lower 
court opinions have refused to engage in a balancing analysis or, though 
applying the balancing approach, have decided that the relevant law 
enforcement interests were outweighed by the defendant’s privacy 
interests. 
While the Article finds that the reasonableness-balancing model has 
not dramatically altered the Fourth Amendment landscape—at least 
not yet—that conclusion does not address the shortcomings of the 
balancing test. Most of the lower court opinions declining to use a 
balancing approach or balancing in favor of defendants have generated 
disagreement, either within the court itself or with other courts, and 
therefore could just as easily have been decided the other way. 
Moreover, all of the cases in which defendants prevailed under the 
balancing model were, or could have been, resolved under the warrant-
presumption model as well. Given the vagueness and malleability of the 
reasonableness-balancing model, and the absence of any principled 
standard suggesting when it applies, the Article advocates that courts 
continue adhering to the warrant-presumption model and exclude 
evidence discovered during warrantless searches that do not fall within 
one of the categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
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Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses joined by the word 
“and”: the Reasonableness Clause prohibits “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,”2 and the Warrant Clause prescribes the prerequisites for a 
warrant.3 Given the “curious[]” way the Amendment is phrased,4 the 
relationship between the two provisions is “almost entirely 
inscrutable,”5 a “syntactical mystery.”6 On its face, the Amendment 
does not specify when a warrant is required, and its constitutional 
history is “foggy.”7 
 
2. U.S. Const. amend. IV (providing that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated”). 
3. See id. (requiring “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,” as 
well as a particular description of “the place to be searched” and “the 
persons or things to be seized”). 
4. George C. Thomas III, The Common Law Endures in the Fourth 
Amendment, 27 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 85, 87 (2018). 
5. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth 
Amendment, 68 U. Miami L. Rev. 589, 595 (2014). 
6. H. Richard Uviller, Reasonability and the Fourth Amendment: A 
(Belated) Farewell to Justice Potter Stewart, 25 Crim. L. Bull. 29, 33 
(1989). 
7. Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 
24 (1969). 
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Some scholars take the position that the two clauses are 
“disjunctive”8 and “independent” of each other,9 that the Reasonable–
ness Clause is the predominant clause and the Warrant Clause simply 
provides safeguards to protect against abusive warrants.10 Under this 
view, the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and 
seizures but does not require, or presumptively require, probable cause 
and a warrant.11 Under the contrary view, the two clauses are 
“conjunctive”12 and “interdependent”13: the Warrant Clause is predom–
inant and constitutionally mandates a warrant, at least in certain 
cases.14 
 
8. Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the 
Divided Court, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 161, 183 (2013). 
9. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical 
Review, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 925, 927 (1997). 
10.  See id. at 927–28. 
11. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 7, at 46–47 (concluding that those who 
“view[] the fourth amendment primarily as a requirement that searches 
be covered by warrants . . . have stood the amendment on its head”); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. 
Rev. 757, 759, 771 (1994) (arguing that the “words” of the Fourth 
Amendment “do not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of 
evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable,” 
and that the Warrant Clause “does not require, presuppose, or even 
encourage warrants—it limits them”). 
12. Murphy, supra note 8, at 183. 
13. Maclin, supra note 9, at 927. 
14. See, e.g., id. at 938 (criticizing the disjunctive view of the Fourth 
Amendment as based on a “facile and categorical interpretation” of the 
language that is not “supported by history,” and concluding that constit–
utional history “tells us more than the nebulous language of the text”); Carol 
S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820, 
824 (1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s “use of the term 
‘reasonable’ . . . positively invites constructions that change with changing 
circumstances” and therefore that “the construction of the . . . 
‘reasonableness’ clause should properly change over time to accommodate 
constitutional purposes more general than the Framers’ specific intentions”). 
Pointing out that a comma separates the Fourth Amendment’s clauses, 
several scholars observed that “it would be easier to argue textually that the 
two clauses are independent” if a semicolon had been used instead. 1 Joshua 
Dressler & Alan C. Michaels, Understanding Criminal Procedure 
§ 4.02, at 51 (6th ed. 2013). But see State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 483 
(Iowa 2014) (concluding that the semicolon between the two clauses in the 
state constitution’s version of the Fourth Amendment “suggests the framers 
believed that there was a relationship between the reasonableness clause and 
the warrant clause”). For a summary of the historical and policy arguments 
advanced in this scholarly debate, see 1 Dressler & Michaels, supra, 
§ 10.01, at 157–64. 
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Although the Supreme Court has not directly engaged this 
academic debate,15 most of its Fourth Amendment decisions over the 
past fifty years have followed a warrant-presumption model, which 
deems warrantless searches and seizures “per se unreasonable . . . 
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”16 Starting in 2001, however, the Court has on three 
occasions deviated from that framework and applied an ad hoc 
reasonableness-balancing model, determining the constitutionality of a 
search by “examining the totality of the circumstances” and balancing 
 
15. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 336–37 (2001) (discussing 
this literature in analyzing the Framers’ views of warrantless misdemeanor 
arrests). The debate has been referenced, and the disjunctive interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment endorsed, by some of the Justices in separate 
opinions. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2243–44 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581–84 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 
420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 621 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 326–28 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 In addition, the Justices addressed the issue in several search-incident-to-
arrest opinions that predated this academic commentary. Compare United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (observing that “[t]he 
mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure 
against unreasonable searches” and that “[t]he relevant test is not whether 
it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was 
reasonable,” a “criterion” that “depends upon the facts and circumstances—
the total atmosphere of the case”), overruled on other grounds by Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 
145, 150 (1947) (noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment has never been held 
to require that every valid search and seizure be effected under the authority 
of a search warrant”; rather, “it is only unreasonable searches and seizures 
which come within the constitutional interdict” and “[t]he test of reason–
ableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms”), overruled on other 
grounds by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), with Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 70 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[o]ne cannot wrench ‘unreason–
able searches’ from the text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment,” and, “[w]hen the Fourth Amendment outlawed ‘unreasonable 
searches’ and then went on to define the very restricted authority that even 
a search warrant . . . could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the 
gloss of history that a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes 
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity”), and Harris, 331 
U.S. at 161–62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (reasoning that “‘[u]nreason–
able’ is not to be determined . . . in isolation” but rather in light of the 
“historic experience” underlying the Fourth Amendment, and “[t]his means 
that, with minor and severely confined exceptions, . . . every search and 
seizure is unreasonable when made without . . . a validly issued warrant”). 
16. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
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“the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” 
against “the degree to which it is needed” to serve “legitimate 
governmental interests.”17 Two of those opinions, United States v. 
Knights and Samson v. California, permitted warrantless searches 
conducted pursuant to a search condition imposed as part of probation 
or parole,18 and the third, Maryland v. King, allowed warrantless DNA 
testing following an arrest.19 
The Supreme Court has never bothered to justify its decision to 
abandon the warrant-presumption model in those three (and only those 
three) cases.20 In fact, the Court has denied that it deviated from 
precedent, referring to the balancing test as the “ordinary” approach to 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.21 A cynic might say that the Justices 
resort to the reasonableness-balancing model when they want to uphold 
the constitutionality of a search that does not easily fall within one of 
the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement.22 Whatever the 
explanation, the Court has never defined, even roughly, which cases 
should be evaluated “by reference to the proposition that the 
‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’”23 
The reasonableness-balancing model has understandably engen–
dered a good deal of academic criticism. It has been called “mushy,”24 
“murky,” and “almost entirely free of content.”25 Pointing out that the 
 
17. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (first quoting Ohio 
v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); and then quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
18. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006); Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. 
19. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 440–41 (2013). 
20. More recent Supreme Court opinions have returned to the warrant-presum–
ption model, again without offering any explanation as to when each model 
applies. See infra notes 64 & 274 and accompanying text. 
21. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. 
22. For an analysis of the applicability of the traditional warrant exceptions 
in the three cases, see infra notes 37–44, 56–57, 67–77 and accompanying 
text. 
23. King, 569 U.S. at 448 (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 855 n.4). 
24. Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: 
The Protections for Policing, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 281, 307 (2016). 
25. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 5, at 591, 602; see also David H. Kaye, A 
Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric 
Databases, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1095, 1103 (2013) (arguing that “a rule-
based system can provide greater accuracy and predictability in judicial 
decisionmaking” than a balancing approach); Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness 
with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 
Miss. L.J. 1133, 1149, 1136 (2012) (observing that the reasonableness model 
allows the Court to “exercise . . . unguided discretion,” which “can lead to 
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Supreme Court’s weighing process tends to favor the prosecution, 
scholars have condemned the model as “rigged”26 and have accused the 
Court of balancing with its “thumb pressing heavily on the 
government’s side of the scale.”27 The scholarly community is not 
unanimous, however,28 and some academics have proposed modifi–
cations to the reasonableness-balancing model.29 
Although I am persuaded by the critiques of the reasonableness-
balancing approach, this Article does not focus on those arguments. 
Instead, it explores the Court’s uncertain and episodic embrace of the 
reasonableness-balancing model with two goals in mind: to analyze 
when the Court started balancing in earnest and to evaluate whether 
the conversion to the reasonableness model is complete. Some scholars 
trace the reasonableness-balancing model back to the late 1960s, 
arguing that the Court “ushered in the era [of] overall reasonableness”30 
in its first administrative inspection opinion, Camara v. Municipal 
Court,31 and its stop-and-frisk decision the following year in Terry v.  
inconsistent results” and “enable[] subconscious biases to influence the 
decision-making process”). 
26. Friedman & Stein, supra note 24, at 297–98 (pointing out that the Court 
“almost always compares the overarching goal of the search scheme against 
a single individual’s privacy interest,” thus comparing “an apple to an 
orchard”). 
27. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 
2004 Utah L. Rev. 977, 1011; see also Lee, supra note 25, at 1147 
(describing the test as “highly deferential” to the government). 
28. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Analysis of Search and Seizure Law, 
164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 594, 623 (2016) (arguing that “economics provides 
a surprisingly helpful lens” to understand Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
“as a way to maximize the benefits of criminal law while minimizing the 
costs of its enforcement,” and pointing out that the reasonableness-balancing 
model is a “thinly disguised cost-benefit analysis” and therefore “clearly fits 
the economic perspective”). 
29. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 25, at 1137, 1159–60 (encouraging the Court to 
“engage in a more stringent form of reasonableness review”—“reasonableness 
review with teeth”—and “scrutinize whether the government had good 
reason for . . . acting without advance judicial authorization” (emphasis 
omitted)); Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1461, 1466, 1464, 1467 (questioning “the 
conventional wisdom” that the relevant “public and private interests are . . . 
always at odds with each other,” and arguing that the Court has “ignored” 
the “collective values in pluralist civic participation and efficient and 
accurate criminal justice administration”). 
30. Reinert, supra note 29, at 1469. 
31. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see, e.g., Friedman & Stein, 
supra note 24, at 290 (charging that “the breach in the doctrinal warrant 
and probable cause model” began in Camara); Kamin & Marceau, supra 
note 5, at 604 (arguing that “no area of Fourth Amendment doctrine 
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Ohio.32 And some academics charge that the Court has departed almost 
entirely from the warrant-presumption model—that “totality of the 
circumstances balancing has become the new normal in Fourth 
Amendment adjudication.”33 This Article maintains that both of those 
claims are overblown. 
In developing that argument, the Article proceeds in three parts. 
After briefly describing the Court’s three reasonableness-balancing 
model opinions in Part I, Part II analyzes the Court’s earlier case law 
and maintains that, prior to 2001, balancing was generally confined to 
cases in which the Justices were either ruling on the creation and scope 
of categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement or evaluating the 
constitutionality of administrative inspection schemes. Although gen–
eral language appears in a few Supreme Court opinions suggesting the 
balancing test may have a place outside the warrant-presumption 
framework, those decisions do not provide a solid foundation for the 
reasonableness-balancing model because they derived support for a 
balancing analysis solely from warrant-presumption model cases or they 
did not deviate substantially from that model. 
Part III then explores what impact the balancing model trilogy has 
had on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, examining subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions as well as opinions issued by the lower federal 
and state courts. This survey finds that the warrant-presumption model 
is still alive and well in the Supreme Court and that the Justices have 
even declined several invitations to rely on the balancing model. The 
 
provides greater evidence for the ascendancy of reasonableness balancing 
than the special needs doctrine” introduced in Camara). 
32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see, e.g., Friedman & Stein, supra note 24, 
at 291–92 (maintaining that Terry “abandoned the warrant and probable 
cause model”); Tracey Maclin, Maryland v King: Terry v Ohio Redux, 2013 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 359, 399 (asserting that Terry “embraced” “open-ended 
balancing analysis”). 
33. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 5, at 610; see id. at 602 (maintaining that 
“the Court has largely replaced its presumptions with a totality of the 
circumstances reasonableness test”); see also Friedman & Stein, supra note 
24, at 288 (describing “the collapse” of the warrant-presumption model); 
Maclin, supra note 32, at 399 (arguing that “the balancing analysis adopted 
in Terry eventually became the ‘touchstone of modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence’” (quoting John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: 
A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 749, 
753 (1998))); Reinert, supra note 29, at 1470 (characterizing the reason–
ableness-balancing model as “the current status quo”). But see David H. 
Kaye, Why So Contrived? Fourth Amendment Balancing, Per Se Rules, and 
DNA Databases After Maryland v. King, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
535, 544, 551 (2014) (calling Maryland v. King “part of [a] still-small family,” 
and noting that the Court had “ventured outside the [warrant-presumption 
model] entirely” on only “a few previous occasions”); Lee, supra note 25, at 
1146 (observing that the Court still uses the warrant-presumption model “in 
the bulk of its cases”). 
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overwhelming majority of lower court decisions applying the Court’s 
trilogy of opinions involve the same issues addressed in those three 
cases: searches of parolees and probationers and collection of DNA 
samples. While a few courts have arguably allowed the balancing 
approach to creep into a limited number of discrete areas beyond those 
involved in the three Supreme Court decisions, most notably in cases 
involving foreign intelligence and national security searches, overall the 
lower courts are continuing to follow the warrant-presumption model 
as well. Moreover, the lower courts have not been as deferential to law 
enforcement as the Supreme Court: some have refused to engage in a 
balancing analysis, and others have weighed the competing interests in 
favor of the defendant. Nevertheless, most of those defendant-friendly 
opinions provoked dissents or disagreements with other courts, and 
therefore could have been decided the other way. And all of the cases 
in which prosecutors lost under the balancing model were, or could have 
been, resolved under the warrant-presumption model as well. Part III 
closes with an assessment of why the Court created the reasonableness-
balancing model and what its future holds, ultimately suggesting that, 
given the amorphousness and subjectivity surrounding the model and 
the absence of any principles governing when it should be applied, 
courts should continue following the warrant-presumption model and 
suppress evidence uncovered during warrantless searches that do not 
fall within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement.  
I. The Reasonableness-balancing Model Trilogy 
The Supreme Court introduced the reasonableness-balancing model 
in 2001, in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s brief and surprisingly unanimous 
opinion in United States v. Knights.34 At issue in Knights was the 
constitutionality of a search condition that allowed warrantless searches 
of a probationer’s home based on reasonable suspicion rather than 
probable cause.35 Knights, who was on summary probation for a 
misdemeanor drug offense, was suspected of being involved in arson and 
various acts of vandalism, and a detective’s search of his home 
uncovered evidence linking him to those crimes.36 
The question presented in Knights was whether a probationer’s 
“agreement to a term of probation” allowing warrantless searches 
“constituted a valid consent to a search by a law enforcement officer 
 
34. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001). 
35. See id. at 114. 
36. See id. at 114–15; United States v. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138, 1140–41 (9th 
Cir. 2000), rev’d, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
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investigating crimes.”37 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Solicitor Gen–
eral’s Office focused on the consent search exception to the warrant 
requirement in briefing and arguing the case.38 But the Court expressly 
declined to decide whether Knights’s signature on the probation order 
setting out the search condition constituted consent.39 
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court had previously upheld a 
probation officer’s search of a home as a permissible administrative 
inspection,40 a search designed to serve some “special need[], beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement,”41 and the Solicitor General’s reply 
brief in Knights relied on Griffin as an alternative justification for the 
search of Knights’s home.42 But the Knights Court did not rely on the 
warrant exception for administrative inspections either. In fact, the 
Court acknowledged that Knights was “not like” Griffin, presumably 
because the search in Knights was conducted by a detective 
investigating unrelated crimes, acting in the government’s “interest in 
apprehending violators of the criminal law.”43 As a result, the Knights 
search did not fit within Griffin’s rationale that a probation officer’s 
role in “supervis[ing]” probationers in order to “reduce recidivism” and 
 
37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 
(2001) (No. 00-1260), 2000 WL 33979551, at *I. 
38. See Brief for the United States at 10, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No. 00-
1260), 2001 WL 799254, at *20; Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, Knights, 
534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No. 00-1260), 2001 WL 1412114, at *4–5; see also Brief 
of Amicus Curiae State of California in Support of Petitioner at 5, Knights, 
534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No. 00-1260), 2001 WL 829723, at *6–7. 
39. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. 
40. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870–71 (1987) (permitting a probation 
officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s home based on “reasonable 
grounds” to believe contraband would be found in the home (quoting Wis. 
Admin. Code HSS §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(1) (1981))). 
41. Id. at 873 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
42. See Reply Brief for the United States at 3, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No. 
00-1260), 2001 WL 1131654, at *3; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 38, at 19–20. Two of the three amicus briefs filed in support of 
the Government also relied on Griffin and the balancing test used to resolve 
administrative inspection cases. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal 
Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, Knights, 534 U.S. 
112 (2001) (No. 00-1260), 2001 WL 799253, at *6; Brief of the Center for the 
Community Interest as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21, 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No. 00-1260), 2001 WL 799252, at *21; see 
also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 39 (likewise discussing 
balancing in the context of Griffin and the special needs cases). 
43. Knights, 534 U.S. at 117, 121. 
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promote “genuine rehabilitation” constituted a special need divorced 
from ordinary criminal law enforcement.44 
Instead of analyzing whether the search in Knights could be 
justified by a warrant exception, the Court relied on what Chief Justice 
Rehnquist called “ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis”—“our general 
Fourth Amendment approach of ‘examining the totality of the 
circumstances.’”45 “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness,” the Court asserted, and “the reasonableness of a search 
is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it 
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’”46 
On Knights’s side of the balance, the Court reasoned that 
“‘[p]robation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction’” that 
follows a conviction and Knights was “unambiguously informed” of the 
search condition, thus “significantly” reducing his reasonable expec–
tation of privacy.47 On the other side of the scales, without 
acknowledging that Knights’s summary probation for a misdemeanor 
charge did not even require supervision by a probation officer,48 the 
Court explained that the State had an interest in reducing the high rate 
of recidivism among probationers.49 
The Court then concluded that the police needed only reasonable 
suspicion to search Knights’s home because, even though the Fourth 
Amendment “ordinarily requires” probable cause to search, “a lesser 
degree” of certainty suffices “when the balance of governmental and 
 
44. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875; see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 859–60 
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding it “no accident” that Knights “forwent 
any reliance on the special needs doctrine” because, unlike “an ordinary law 
enforcement officer and a probationer unknown to him,” a probation officer 
plays a “special role” in “supervising the wayward probationer’s reintegration 
into society” and is “not, or at least not principally, [serving] the general law 
enforcement goal of detecting crime”). 
45. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122, 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 
(1996)). 
46. Id. at 118–19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
47. Id. at 119–20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. 
at 874). But see 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise 
on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(c), at 563–64 (6th ed. 2020) (calling 
the argument that an expectation of privacy can be reduced by “advance 
notice of the government’s claimed search authority” “reasoning [that] is 
totally circular”). 
48. See United States v. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2000), 
rev’d, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
49. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120–21. 
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private interests makes such a standard reasonable.”50 Finally, obser–
ving that “general or individual circumstances, including ‘diminished 
expectations of privacy,’ may justify an exception to the warrant 
requirement,” the Court held that the same considerations that 
supported lowering the probable cause requirement likewise made a 
warrant “unnecessary.”51 
Five years later, in Samson v. California, the Court addressed a 
search condition imposed on a parolee pursuant to a California statute 
that permitted warrantless searches of parolees without any suspicion 
whatsoever.52 Samson was stopped by a police officer who knew he was 
on parole and suspected he had an outstanding parole warrant.53 After 
discovering that no such warrant in fact existed, the officer nonetheless 
searched Samson “based solely on [his] status as a parolee” and found 
a baggie of methamphetamine in his pocket.54 
Quoting Knights, Justice Thomas’s opinion for the six Justices in 
the majority opened its substantive Fourth Amendment discussion by 
noting that “‘[u]nder our general Fourth Amendment approach’ we 
‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether a 
search is reasonable” and then setting out the balancing test articulated 
in Knights.55 As in Knights, the Court declined to consider whether the 
search of Samson could be justified under the warrant exceptions for 
 
50. Id. at 121 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
51. Id. at 121–22 (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)). For 
further discussion of McArthur’s language, see infra notes 159–162 and 
accompanying text. 
52. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006). 
53. See id. 
54. Id. at 846–47; see also People v. Samson, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
9304, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2004) (reporting that the officer testified 
that he “conduct[ed] parole searches ‘on a regular basis’ unless he ha[d] ‘other 
work to do’ or already ‘dealt with’ the parolee” and that he “intended to 
discharge [Samson] after the parole search ‘if he had nothing on him illegal’” 
(quoting suppression hearing testimony)), aff’d, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
55. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted in original) (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118). Although 
the State’s brief likewise focused on the balancing test adopted in Knights, 
see Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 6–10, 13–21, Samson, 547 U.S. 
843 (2006) (No. 04-9728), 2006 WL 148594, at *6–10, *13–21, the Solicitor 
General’s Office devoted only the last several pages of its amicus brief to 
Knights and the reasonableness-balancing model. See Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27–30, Samson, 547 
U.S. 843 (2006) (No. 04-9728), 2006 WL 139218, at *27–30. 
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consent searches56 or administrative inspections57: “[b]ecause we find 
that the search at issue here is reasonable under our general Fourth 
Amendment approach,” the majority explained, “our holding under 
general Fourth Amendment principles renders such an examination 
unnecessary.”58 Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Court had 
permitted suspicionless searches only in “limited circumstances, 
namely, programmatic and special needs searches,” but he responded 
by observing that the Court had never indicated these were “the only 
limited circumstances” in which suspicionless searches were consti–
tutional and he concluded that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness” rather than “individualized suspicion.”59 
Applying the reasonableness model to the search at issue in 
Samson, the Court reasoned that parolees have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than even probationers because “parole is more akin to 
imprisonment,” and therefore they have “severely diminished expec–
tations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”60 The majority also 
echoed here the argument made in Knights that the search condition 
was “‘clearly expressed’” to Samson and his “acceptance of a clear and 
 
56. The Court explained that, although a California appellate court had found 
that prisoners eligible for parole have a choice between remaining in prison 
and agreeing to the search condition, the California Supreme Court had not 
“squarely” considered the question and the State might not have preserved 
the issue below. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852–53 n.3. But cf. id. at 863 n.4 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, even if a prisoner could “choose to 
remain in prison rather than be released on parole,” prisoners are likewise 
subjected to “suspicionless searches” and therefore the notion of a parolee 
consenting to a search condition is a “‘manifest fiction’” (quoting 4 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amend–
ment § 10.10(b), at 440–41 (4th ed. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))); People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 448 (Cal. 1998) (interpreting a 
prior version of the state statute and rejecting a consent argument on the 
grounds that “parole is not a matter of choice [because] the prisoner must 
accept it”). 
57. Although the search of Samson, like the search of Knights’s home, seems like 
ordinary criminal law enforcement, see supra notes 40–44 and accompanying 
text, the bulk of the Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Samson relied on 
Griffin and the warrant exception for administrative searches. See Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 55, 
at 8–27; see also Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 55, at 21–31 
(raising the special needs jurisprudence as an alternative justification for the 
search); Antoine McNamara, Note, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Proba–
tion, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 209, 243–45 (2007) (likewise endorsing 
a special needs justification for searches of probationers and parolees). 
58. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n.3. 
59. Id. at 855 n.4 (also noting that “the object of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness” (emphasis omitted)). 
60. Id. at 850, 852. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
The Origins and Legacy of the Fourth Amendment                 
Reasonableness-balancing Model 
170 
unambiguous search condition ‘significantly diminished [his] reasonable 
expectation of privacy.’”61 
On the law enforcement side of the equation, the Court found that 
the State had a “substantial” interest in reducing the high rate of 
recidivism among parolees and a regime of suspicionless parolee searches 
helped address that interest.62 Finally, the majority rejected the 
dissenters’ argument that the California statute gave law enforcement 
officials “unbridled discretion” to search parolees, noting that the State 
prohibited “‘arbitrary, capricious or harassing’” parolee searches.63 
After Knights and Samson, the Court “proceed[ed] with business as 
usual,” applying the warrant-presumption model in Fourth Amendment 
cases except for those involving “the two P’s—probationers and 
parolees”—until its 2013 decision in Maryland v. King.64 King involved 
a Maryland statute that allowed police officers to take a DNA sample 
“[a]s part of a routine booking procedure” following an arrest for a 
“serious offense[]” and then to attempt to match the arrestee’s DNA  
61. Id. at 852 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 120 (2001)); 
see supra note 47 and accompanying text. But see Samson, 547 U.S. at 863 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling this argument “entirely circular”). 
62. Samson, 547 U.S. at 853. But see id. at 865 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that the search condition was imposed on all California 
parolees, “whatever the nature of their crimes [or] likelihood of recidivism”); 
Brief for the Petitioner at 28, Samson, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (No. 04-9728), 
2005 WL 3785204, at *28 (noting that every state except California and 
possibly one other was able to address parolee recidivism without allowing 
law enforcement officials to “engage in suspicionless, nonconsensual searches 
of parolees”); James M. Binnall, They Released Me from My Cage . . . But 
They Still Keep Me Handcuffed: A Parolee’s Reaction to Samson v. 
California, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 541, 543–44 (2007) (calling the Court’s 
reliance on California’s parolee recidivism rate a “flawed tool” because it is 
not limited to “new crimes parolees commit” but also includes “technical” 
parole violations, such as drinking alcohol, that “do not harm society and 
should not factor into the parolee’s place on the continuum of 
punishment”). 
63. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856 (quoting People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 
1998)). But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Samson, 547 U.S. 843 
(2006) (No. 04-9728), 2006 WL 496216, at *24 (pointing out that the one 
hundred to two hundred California parolees and probationers who had 
challenged searches as arbitrary, capricious, or harassing had all been 
unsuccessful); Maclin, supra note 32, at 385 n.141 (questioning the 
distinction between a suspicionless search and one that is arbitrary and 
capricious, and arguing that searching Samson simply because he was on 
parole “suggested that the search was arbitrary”). 
64. Kaye, supra note 25, at 1118. For Supreme Court opinions applying the 
warrant-presumption model during this time period, see, for example, 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2013), Kentucky v. King, 563 
U.S. 452, 459 (2011), and City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760–61 
(2010). For later cases, see infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
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profile to DNA samples collected in unsolved cases.65 Following King’s 
arrest on assault charges, a sample of his DNA was taken with a buccal 
swab, and, four months later, his DNA was found to match that taken 
from a rape victim six years earlier.66 
As in Knights and Samson, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
this five-to-four decision did not rely on any of the well-established 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Court did refer to the 
“routine administrative procedure[s] at a police station house incident 
to booking”67 and described as “instructive” Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Association, which upheld the drug testing of certain 
railroad employees as a permissible administrative inspection.68 But the 
Court distinguished DNA testing of arrestees from special needs 
administrative searches, properly acknowledging that Skinner involved 
“a different . . . context” and that “the search here . . . differ[ed] from 
the sort of programmatic searches . . . the Court ha[d] previously 
labeled as ‘special needs’ searches.”69 After all, as Justice Scalia pointed 
 
65. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 440 (2013). The state statute was limited 
to suspects charged with burglary, a “crime of violence,” or an attempt to 
commit one of those crimes. Id. at 443 (quoting Md. Code Ann., Pub. 
Safety § 2-504(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011)). 
66. See id. at 441. 
67. Id. at 449–50 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 
640, 643 (1983) (allowing police to search arrestees’ belongings in order to 
protect their property and ensure they do not injure themselves or others)); 
see also id. at 456 (referring to “reasonable booking searches”); id. at 461 
(analogizing DNA testing to other “routine ‘administrative steps incident 
to arrest’” (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 
(1991))). 
68. Id. at 448 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) 
(discussing “the standardized nature of the [drug] tests and the minimal 
discretion vested in those charged with administering the program”)). 
69. Id. at 448, 462 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997)); see 
also id. at 463 (“The special needs cases, though in full accord with the 
result reached here, do not have a direct bearing on the issues presented in 
this case, because unlike the search of a citizen who has not been suspected 
of a wrong, a detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy.”). For further 
discussion of the Court’s diminished expectation of privacy distinction, see 
infra note 219 and accompanying text. But see King, 569 U.S. at 469–70 
n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the Court’s efforts to distinguish the 
special needs cases “perplexing,” and wondering why the majority “spill[ed] 
so much ink on the special need of identification if a special need is not 
required”); Kaye, supra note 33, at 557 (observing that the Court’s 
“balancing incorporated only the state’s special (non-crime-solving) 
interests,” and inferring that “the Court implicitly, and awkwardly, created 
a new special-needs-type exception” for DNA testing). But see Pretzantzin 
v. Holder, 725 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013) (interpreting King as applying 
“the inventory or booking search exception” to the warrant requirement); 
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out in dissent, the Maryland statute was designed to collect DNA 
samples “as part of an official investigation into a crime”70—or, as he 
more colorfully put it at oral argument, “to catch the bad guys.”71 
The King majority also mentioned the “uncontested” authority to 
conduct searches incident to arrest,72 but had “good reason” for not 
relying on that warrant exception either.73 Police are permitted to 
conduct a search at the time of arrest to prevent arrestees from 
accessing a weapon or destroying evidence.74 But King’s DNA was not 
taken until he was booked,75 and DNA testing is not aimed at 
uncovering weapons or preserving evidence.76 Moreover, the Court had 
 
Hawkins v. United States, 113 A.3d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (likewise 
characterizing King as involving a “special needs search”). 
70. King, 569 U.S. at 474 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Md. Code Ann., 
Pub. Safety § 2-505(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011)). 
71. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (No. 12-207), 
2006 WL 496216, at *24; see id. (the State’s lawyer argued that a “corollary 
purpose” of the DNA testing was to assist bail determinations, but conceded 
that “solving crimes” was “the key component”); see also Maclin, supra 
note 32, at 382 (noting that “identifying arrestees” is “directly related to 
law enforcement” and “police are thoroughly involved in conducting and 
using the results of DNA searches”); Murphy, supra note 8, at 177 
(observing that the Court made a “tacit concession” that the DNA testing 
was “ordinary [criminal] law enforcement”). But see Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 32 n.12, King, 569 U.S. 
435 (2013) (No. 12-207), 2013 WL 50686, at *13 n.12 (arguing briefly in 
favor of the administrative search exception on the grounds that DNA 
testing “is not targeted at investigating any particular crime,” “a DNA 
fingerprint standing alone is not incriminating,” and “exoneration of the 
innocent, supervision of arrestees . . . before trial, and improvement in 
future public safety” are special needs distinct from ordinary criminal law 
enforcement (emphasis omitted)); Kaye, supra note 33, at 566 (proposing 
that “[a]uthentication-identification is a special need” because, “[i]f special 
needs balancing is available for single purpose searches, it also should be 
available for multipurpose ones” (emphasis omitted)). 
72. King, 569 U.S. at 449. 
73. Id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
74. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339–41 (2009); Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
75. See King, 569 U.S. at 440. 
76. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 71, at 26–27 (the Solicitor 
General’s lawyer acknowledging in response to a question from Justice 
Kennedy that searches incident to arrest are “bottomed on different 
justifications than the ones . . . we’re advancing here”); Kaye, supra note 
33, at 562–63 (noting that, while Justice Kennedy “toyed” at oral argument 
with the idea of treating DNA collection as a search incident to arrest, his 
majority opinion “wisely veered away” from that argument because DNA 
testing does not serve the interests underlying that warrant exception). 
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suggested in Schmerber v. California that searches incident to arrest 
may not “involv[e] intrusions beyond the body’s surface.”77 
Instead of relying on a warrant exception, the King majority quoted 
Samson and announced—with no explanation—that this case “falls 
within the category of cases this Court has analyzed by reference to the 
proposition that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.’”78 “As the text of the 
Fourth Amendment indicates,” the Court explained, “the ultimate 
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is reason–
ableness.”79 “[A]pplication of ‘traditional standards of reasonableness,’” 
Justice Kennedy continued, means that, even when a warrant is not 
required, a court must balance the competing govern–ment and 
individual interests “to determine if the intrusion was reasonable” 
“rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness.”80 
Examining first the Government’s side of the scales, the Court 
found that the Maryland statute served the “legitimate” interest in 
affording the police “a safe and accurate way to process and identify” 
those “they must take into custody.”81 Interestingly, the Court did not 
 
77. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966); see also Maclin, supra 
note 32, at 376 (concluding that Schmerber “expressly foreclosed” searches 
incident to arrest “into the bodies of arrestees”). 
78. King, 569 U.S. at 448 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 
(2006)). Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s dissent asserted, conveniently ignoring 
Samson, that “[i]t is only when a governmental purpose aside from crime-
solving is at stake that we engage in the free-form ‘reasonableness’ inquiry 
that the Court indulges at length today.” Id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 466 (“Whenever this Court has allowed a suspicionless search, 
it has insisted upon a justifying motive apart from the investigation of 
crime.”). But cf. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 3, King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) 
(No. 12-207), 2013 WL 620877, at *5 (acknowledging that Samson “appl[ied] 
a balancing test in the field of criminal law enforcement”). 
79. King, 569 U.S. at 447 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)). 
80. Id. at 448 (first quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); 
and then quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001)) (noting 
that even searches authorized by a warrant exception are “not beyond 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny” and must be “reasonable in . . . scope and 
manner of execution”). For lower court opinions reading this language to 
require prosecutors to satisfy both the warrant-presumption model and the 
reasonableness-balancing model, see infra notes 334–343 and accompanying 
text. 
81. King, 569 U.S. at 449. The Court went on to explain that law enforcement 
officials need to be able to ascertain whether an arrestee has assumed a fake 
identity or is a “devious and dangerous criminal[]” so that they know 
whether and where to detain the arrestee in order to protect the safety of 
prison staff and others, to ensure the arrestee does not flee or pose a danger 
to the community if released on bail, and to serve “the salutary effect of 
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cite Samson in this discussion (and never cited Knights), and it did not 
mention the law enforcement interest in solving cold cases.82 Instead, 
analogizing to other methods of identification, such as photographs and 
fingerprints, the Court described DNA as “a markedly more accurate 
form of identifying arrestees.”83 
Turning to the defendant’s privacy interests, the majority ignored 
the fact that it could not rely on the twin rationales of Knights and 
Samson: King had not accepted “a clear and unambiguous search 
condition,” and his arrest did not put him on a “‘continuum’ of state-
imposed punishments.”84 Nevertheless, the Court explained that the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy “may depend upon the 
individual’s legal relationship with the State” and arrestees have a 
reduced expectation of privacy because they may be subjected to other 
 
freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the same offense.” Id. at 450, 
455. But see id. at 473–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “this search 
had nothing to do with identification” because King’s DNA profile was not 
added to Maryland’s DNA database until after the bail determination had 
been made, was not sent to the FBI’s national DNA database until four 
months after his arrest, and was then compared to the DNA collected from 
unsolved crime scenes rather than DNA taken from “known convicts or 
arrestees”; concluding, therefore, that, “if anything was ‘identified’ . . . , it 
was not King” (whose “identity was already known”) but a “previously-
taken [DNA] sample from [an] earlier [unsolved] crime” (emphasis 
omitted)); State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 682 n.21 (Vt. 2014) (questioning 
the exoneration justification on the grounds that innocent defendants can 
voluntarily submit their DNA); 3 LaFave, supra note 47, § 5.4(c), at 298 
(describing the Court’s “general ‘identification’ purpose” argument as 
“bogus”); David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law 
Enforcement, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 176, 203 (2001) (calling the identification 
rationale for DNA testing “extremely implausible,” and pointing out that 
“[t]he legislative interest in DNA databases . . . has always been to generate 
investigative leads”). 
82. See 3 LaFave, supra note 47, § 5.4(c), at 301 (charging that the King majority 
“never assessed the . . . case in light of” Samson, “the one and only suspicion–
less-search/no-special-needs/balancing-of-interests precedent”). 
83. King, 569 U.S. at 459. But see id. at 476, 478 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling 
these comparisons “inapposite” because photographs are not searches within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, even if fingerprinting constit–
utes a search, the results are available in less than an hour and thus 
fingerprints are “taken primarily to identify” arrestees rather than “to solve 
crimes”). 
84. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852, 850 (2006) (quoting United States 
v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)); cf. Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 71, at 11 (Justice Sotomayor asking why arrest triggers the same 
“assumption” underlying Samson and Knights—that probationers and 
parolees are “out in the world” only because of “the largesse of the State” 
and therefore their homes are equally subject to searches as their cells would 
be). 
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searches, such as searches incident to arrest.85 The Court also 
characterized a buccal cheek swab as a “brief” and “minimal intrusion” 
because it “does not break the skin,” “‘involves virtually no risk, trau–
ma, or pain,’” and “does not increase the indignity already attendant 
to normal incidents of arrest.”86 The analysis of King’s DNA did not 
constitute “a significant invasion of privacy” either, the Court 
continued, because the parts of his DNA that were used only disclosed, 
and were tested for, information about identification and not “genetic 
traits,”87 and the Maryland legislation included “statutory protections 
that guard[ed] against further invasion of privacy.”88 Although the 
 
85. King, 569 U.S. at 462 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 654 (1995)). But see Maclin, supra note 32, at 363 (arguing that “it 
will be difficult to cabin the Court’s logic” because this “reasoning can be 
used to support” DNA testing of anyone arrested or even stopped for any 
minor or traffic offense as well as those “who possess diminished privacy 
interests vis-à-vis the government (such as public school students, driver’s 
license applicants, and lawyers)”); Murphy, supra note 8, at 174–75 (noting 
that the Court “could have walled off the opinion as a categorical exception 
that applies only to convicted offenders and arrestees,” but, by “equating 
DNA sampling with fingerprinting,” King “effectively suggest[ed] that 
anywhere a fingerprint is permissible, a DNA test might be too”). 
86. King, 569 U.S. at 463–64 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
771 (1996)); cf. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, “A World of 
Difference”? Law Enforcement, Genetic Data, and the Fourth Amendment, 
70 Duke L.J. 705, 746–47 (2021) (presenting results of survey data, which 
found that collecting arrestees’ DNA was seen as less invasive than a frisk, 
and reporting that fewer than half of the survey participants thought such 
testing violated a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
87. King, 569 U.S. at 464–65. But see Brief for the Respondent at 46–47, King, 
569 U.S. 435 (2013) (No. 12-207), 2013 WL 315233, at *23–24 (arguing that 
“scientific advances may allow additional personal information to be gleaned 
from [DNA] data,” and pointing out that the Maryland statute allows the 
State to “include additional genetic information in an arrestee’s ‘DNA 
record’” that “‘directly relate[s] to the identification of individuals’” and also 
to “retain an individual’s DNA sample even after a DNA profile has been 
prepared” (quoting Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 2-505(b)(1) (Lexis–
Nexis 2011))); Murphy, supra note 8, at 180 (predicting that if a “pedophile 
gene” or “violence gene” is found, “then surely law enforcement will seek to 
mine genetic information for that ‘identification purpose’” given the Court’s 
rationale that “law enforcement needs to know just whom it is dealing 
with”). But see King, 569 U.S. at 464–65 (admonishing that testing DNA to 
ascertain “an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease or other 
hereditary factors not relevant to identity . . . would present additional 
privacy concerns not present here”). For discussion of a subsequent Supreme 
Court opinion that described this aspect of the Maryland statute somewhat 
differently, see infra note 289. 
88. King, 569 U.S. at 465. Earlier in the opinion, the Court had observed that 
the Maryland statute was restricted to arrests for a limited number of 
“serious crimes,” did not allow an arrestee’s DNA to be “processed or placed 
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Court did not discuss limits on discretion in weighing the intrusiveness 
of the search, earlier Justice Kennedy had noted that the Maryland 
statute required a DNA sample following all arrests for certain “serious 
crimes” and therefore “DNA collection [was] not subject to the 
judgment” of individual police officers.89 
 
in a database” until after a judicial determination of probable cause at 
arraignment, and required that DNA samples be destroyed if, for example, 
the arrestee was acquitted or pardoned. Id. at 443. Compare id. at 461, 463, 
465 (noting that “the necessary predicate of a valid arrest for a serious 
offense” was “fundamental” to the weight given to the defendant’s 
expectation of privacy and that that expectation is reduced after an arrest 
“for a dangerous offense that may require detention before trial,” and 
concluding that DNA testing is constitutional “[w]hen officers make an arrest 
supported by probable cause . . . for a serious offense”), and id. at 465 
(admonishing that “[t]he Court need not speculate about the risks posed ‘by 
a system that did not contain comparable security provisions’” (quoting 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977))), with id. at 445–46 (acknowledging 
that other states’ DNA statutes “vary in their particulars” and therefore 
“this case implicates more than the specific Maryland law”). But see id. at 
481 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding it difficult to “imagine what principle 
could possibly justify” restricting the majority’s holding to serious crimes, 
and concluding that “an entirely predictable consequence” of King is to allow 
DNA collection from anyone who is “ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and 
for whatever reason”); 3 LaFave, supra note 47, § 5.4(c), at 302 (observing 
that the statutory limitations were not “explicitly encompassed within the 
Court’s holding”). For illustrations of lower court opinions evaluating more 
expansive statutes in the wake of King, see, for example, Haskell v. Harris, 
745 F.3d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding, in a 
brief per curiam opinion, that the broader California statute, which collects 
DNA following any felony arrest, was “clearly” constitutional after King), 
and People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1142, 1145, 1146 (Cal. 2018) (noting, 
without resolving the issue in the context of the California statute, that “as 
a matter of ordinary usage, a felony is considered a ‘serious’ offense,” that 
“given the basic logic of King, we cannot say” that analyzing DNA following 
an arrest without waiting for the arraignment “undermines the reasona–
bleness of the search,” and that King “mentioned Maryland’s automatic 
destruction provisions in passing, [but] attached no significance to them in 
its constitutional analysis”). But see State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 809 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (distinguishing King on the grounds that the Court 
“took into consideration” the Maryland statute’s limitations). 
89. King, 569 U.S. at 447–48. But see Brief for the Respondent, supra note 87, 
at 43 (pointing out that “police will often have considerable latitude to 
charge defendants with offenses that qualify for DNA collection,” and noting 
that King was originally charged with both first- and second-degree assault 
(although the first-degree charge was later dropped) and the police could 
not have collected his DNA had he been charged with only second-degree 
assault); Murphy, supra note 8, at 189, 190 (arguing that “[t]he notion that 
arrestee testing invites no law enforcement discretion makes sense only if 
one believes that the police lack discretion in making decisions about 
arrest,” and positing that “it surely does not strain the imagination to 
consider that police may begin selecting charges with one eye on the DNA 
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With King, the trilogy was complete. The next Part of the Article 
explores the roots of the reasonableness-balancing approach featured in 
Knights, Samson, and King with an eye towards examining whether the 
Court had any precedential support for that model or whether the three 
cases changed the face of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
II. The Origins of the Reasonableness-balancing Model 
As noted above,90 some academics reject the position advocated in 
the previous discussion; rather than viewing the reasonableness-
balancing model as originating in 2001 with Knights, they trace it back 
to the 1960s, to the Supreme Court decisions endorsing warrant 
exceptions for administrative inspections and stops and frisks in 
Camara v. Municipal Court91 and Terry v. Ohio.92 In a similar vein, 
Knights, Samson, and King include repeated assertions suggesting that 
the reasonableness-balancing model is the Court’s “general,”93 
“ordinary,”94 and “traditional”95 approach to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In fact, however, the Court’s precedents, at least in the 
previous fifty years, consistently adhered to the warrant-presumption 
model.96 Unsurprisingly, then, the Justices were able to offer very little 
in the way of support for using a freewheeling balancing test to analyze 
the constitutionality of a particular search, and the balancing approach 
that appears in the trilogy of reasonableness-balancing model cases 
differs markedly from the weighing the Court previously did within the 
framework of the warrant-presumption model in opinions like Camara 
and Terry. 
After examining the balancing analysis conducted in the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment case law before Knights, Samson, and 
King, this Part of the Article goes on to discuss the precedent cited in 
 
collection statute”). But see United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 
2017) (citing King as illustrating the principle that, when the Court uses 
the balancing model, it “replace[s] the warrant requirement . . . with a 
limitation on the discretion of officers conducting the searches”); Villarreal, 
475 S.W.3d at 810 (distinguishing King on the grounds that the police 
exercised “no discretion” in enforcing the Maryland statute). 
90. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
91. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537–39 (1967). 
92. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
93. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848, 852 n.3 (2006); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
94. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. 
95. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
96. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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those three decisions, other possible sources of support for the 
reasonableness-balancing model, and finally Supreme Court rulings that 
undermine the balancing approach. Although general language evoking 
an ad hoc balancing approach can be found in a few Supreme Court 
opinions, they rely exclusively on warrant-presumption model decisions 
or they do not depart substantially from that model. Therefore, this 
Part ultimately rejects the view that Knights broke no new ground in 
deciding to use a balancing approach to determine the constitutionality 
of the search at issue there. 
A. Balancing Before Knights 
 To be sure, the Court did rely on balancing tests in deciding what 
constitutional rules govern law enforcement officials prior to 2001. 
Thus, under the warrant-presumption model, the Court resorted to a 
balancing approach in ruling on the creation and scope of categorical 
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements. 
 In the landmark decision in Terry, for example, Chief Justice 
Warren’s opinion engaged in an extensive analysis of the competing law 
enforcement and privacy interests before deciding to endorse the stop-
and-frisk exception.97 Admonishing that “the central inquiry under the 
Fourth Amendment” is “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of 
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security,” 
the Court quoted from Camara in observing that, “[i]n order to assess 
the reasonableness of Officer McFadden’s conduct as a general 
proposition, . . . there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the 
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’”98 The result of that 
balancing process was to allow law enforcement officials to make a 
warrantless stop and frisk based on reasonable suspicion.99 But, once 
 
97. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10–15. 
98. Id. at 19, 20–21 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Camara 
v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)); see id. at 20 (noting that “the 
conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s 
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures” (citing 
Richard M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. 
Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 393, 396–403 (1963) (surveying the 
Fourth Amendment’s constitutional history and the Supreme Court’s 
search-incident-to-arrest opinions discussed supra note 15, and arguing that 
the Fourth Amendment mandates both that an exception is required for a 
warrantless search and additionally that all searches must be performed 
reasonably under all the circumstances))). 
99. See id. at 30–31. For additional opinions in the Terry line of cases using a 
balancing approach to determine the permissible scope of stops and frisks, 
see, for example, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227–29 (1985) 
(applying a balancing test in permitting Terry stops to investigate previous 
unsolved felonies), and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) 
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the Court weighed the competing interests in Terry, the consti–
tutionality of subsequent stops and frisks turned on whether the police 
had reasonable suspicion and stayed within the limited confines of the 
intrusion allowed by Terry, and not on which party won the balancing 
test on the facts of the particular case.100 
The Court has similarly adopted a balancing approach in deciding 
when to allow other seizures on a standard of proof lower than probable 
cause. In Michigan v. Summers, the Court relied on Terry and 
considered the competing governmental and individual interests in 
evaluating the constitutionality of the warrantless seizure involved in 
requiring residents to “re-enter” and “remain” in their home while 
police execute a search warrant.101 Invoking the Fourth Amendment’s 
“ultimate standard of reasonableness,” the Court considered “the 
character of the official intrusion and its justification” in deciding that 
such detentions were permissible.102 But Summers, the Court later 
emphasized, articulated a “categorical” rule that did not turn on either 
“the ‘quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the 
intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.’”103 
When the Court in Bailey v. United States subsequently refused to 
expand “the rule in Summers” “beyond the immediate vicinity of the 
premises to be searched,”104 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, joined 
by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, emphasized that the “interest-
balancing approach” taken by the lower court and advocated by the 
dissent was “incompatible with” Summers’s “categorical rule.”105 It was 
the dissenters who quoted the “touchstone” language106 in advancing 
the lower court’s view that law enforcement officials executing a search 
 
(relying on a balancing test in concluding that “the principles of Terry and 
its progeny” allow the brief detention of luggage based on reasonable 
suspicion). 
100. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–57 (2015) (holding 
that a traffic stop lasted longer than authorized by Terry); United States 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418–19 (1981) (finding that reasonable suspicion to 
stop a vehicle existed on the facts there). 
101. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). 
102. Id. at 699, 701. 
103. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 
705 n.19); see also Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193 (2013) (des–
cribing Summers as “defin[ing] an important category of cases in which 
detention is allowed without probable cause to arrest”). 
104. Bailey, 568 U.S. at 201. 
105. Id. at 203 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
106. Id. at 211 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 
459 (2011)). 
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warrant should be allowed to detain individuals they see leaving a 
residence so long as they act “as soon as reasonably practicable.”107 
Although “[t]he existence and scope of the Summers exception” turned 
on a balancing of the competing interests, Justice Scalia responded, the 
“categorical, bright-line rule” that emerged from that balancing process 
did not allow for “open-ended balancing . . . [w]eighing the equities” “in 
an individual case.”108 Using a balancing test to create “a narrow, 
categorical exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require–
ment, Justice Scalia pointed out, is very different from the “open-ended 
‘reasonableness’ inquiry” the lower court used to conclude that the 
police acted reasonably under the circumstances of that case.109 
The Court has likewise used a balancing test in articulating the 
“constitutional standard[s]” that govern not just “when” but also “how” 
a warrantless seizure may be made.110 In Graham v. Connor, for 
example, the Court balanced the competing individual and law 
enforcement interests in holding that “the question” to be asked in 
evaluating Fourth Amendment excessive force cases is “whether the 
officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them” as “judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene.”111 But the Court’s reliance on a 
balancing test in creating this “settled and exclusive framework” for 
analyzing excessive force claims is very different from rebalancing the 
competing interests on the facts of each case.112 And the Court’s 
instruction that “the totality of the circumstances” must be considered 
in deciding whether a particular use of force was objectively reasonable 
is also distinguishable from an ad hoc balancing test that is constantly 
reapplied in every case.113 A significant number of Fourth Amendment 
issues turn on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis but do not 
involve any sort of balancing process.114 
 
107. Id. at 207 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 
197, 208 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 186 (2013)). 
108. Id. at 203–04 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
109. Id. at 205. 
110. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395 (1989) (emphasis omitted). 
111. Id. at 397, 396; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (likewise 
applying a balancing test in articulating the limits on the use of deadly force 
to apprehend a fleeing felon). 
112. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017). 
113. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 9). 
114. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2002) (noting that 
the “proper inquiry” in deciding whether “‘a reasonable person would feel free 
to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter’”—and 
thus whether a Fourth Amendment “seizure” has occurred—“necessitates a 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
The Origins and Legacy of the Fourth Amendment                 
Reasonableness-balancing Model 
181 
Admittedly, the Court has required that a balancing test be 
conducted in assessing the constitutionality of one specific category of 
warrantless searches: administrative inspections, that is, searches 
designed to serve some “special need[], beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.”115 In fact, as explained above,116 the balancing test 
applied in Terry was borrowed from the Court’s first opinion to uphold 
the constitutionality of an “administrative inspection program[],” 
Camara v. Municipal Court.117 But, with the exception of the special 
needs cases, once the Court has balanced the competing interests and 
created a new warrant exception, subsequent searches are evaluated by 
determining whether the prerequisites for that warrant exception are 
satisfied rather than by continuously rebalancing the relevant interests 
based on the facts of each case.118 
 
consideration of ‘all the circumstances surrounding the encounter’” (quoting 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 439 (1991))); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983) (requiring that judges use a “totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis” in assessing whether a search is supported by probable cause); 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (instructing that “the total–
ity of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account” in 
determining reasonable suspicion); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
227 (1973) (adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances test to measure the 
voluntariness of consent). 
115. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)). For 
criticism of the Court’s distinction between special needs and criminal law 
enforcement, see, for example, Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s 
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 977, 1025 (calling the 
distinction “illusory” and “unwise”), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the 
Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
87, 89 (referring to the distinction as “chimerical and irrelevant”). But cf. 
Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless 
Searches, “Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 Miss. L.J. 501, 551 
(2004) (linking the Court’s decision to take on a “judicial oversight” “role as 
an active ‘policy magistrate’” in these cases to “the concerns over general 
warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment”). 
116. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
117. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967). For other opinions documen–
ting the Court’s use of a balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of 
special needs searches, see, for example, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 67, 78 (2001), Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–
50, 455 (1990), Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619–20 
(1989), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559–60 (1979). 
118. The Court has also applied a balancing test in deciding when an exclusionary 
remedy is available, weighing the deterrent benefits of suppressing the 
evidence against the costs imposed by the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Hudson 
v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594–99 (2006) (refusing to apply the exclusionary 
rule to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement); United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (creating the good-faith exception to the 
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The distinction between the uncabined reasonableness-balancing 
model and the limited use of a balancing test in administrative inspec–
tion cases is reinforced by the relationship between the rationales in 
Knights and Griffin v. Wisconsin. In refusing to be constrained by 
Griffin’s special needs analysis, the Knights Court described as “dubious 
logic” the view that Griffin’s decision allowing “a particular search” 
impliedly prohibited “any search that [was] not like it.”119 That 
reasoning, the Court continued, was rebutted by Griffin’s “express 
statement” that its special needs analysis made it unnecessary to assess 
whether probationer searches were “otherwise reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”120 
But in Griffin, the state supreme court had recognized a new 
exception to the warrant requirement, “a probationer exception,” which 
that court justified on the grounds that “probation places limitations 
on the liberty and privacy rights of probationers.”121 When the case 
reached the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion preferred 
not to “embrace a new principle of law,” as he thought the Wisconsin 
court “evidently did,” but instead to resolve the case based on “well-
established principles” and therefore to use the special needs rubric to 
uphold the probation officer’s search of Griffin’s home.122 By the time 
Knights came along, however, the Court did not have similar qualms 
about breaking new ground and relying on reasoning similar to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s to justify using a balancing test to evaluate 
the constitutionality of the investigative search of Knights’s home. 
The freewheeling balancing analysis introduced in Knights differed, 
therefore, from the Court’s prior, limited use of a balancing approach: 
in ruling on the creation and scope of categorical exceptions to the 
warrant requirement and in evaluating the constitutionality of admin–
istrative inspections. The next Section goes on to analyze the precedent 
the Court offered in Knights, Samson, and King to support the 
balancing done in those cases. 
 
exclusionary rule). For criticism of the Court’s use of “two tiers of reasonable–
ness review” in evaluating “both the substance of the [Fourth Amendment] 
right and the availability of a remedy” under these “overlapping, but distinct, 
reasonableness tests,” see Kamin & Marceau, supra note 5, at 590. 
119. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001). 
120. Id. at 117–18 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876, 880). 
121. State v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d 535, 541, 536 (Wis. 1986) (allowing probation 
officers to search a probationer’s home without a warrant based on “‘reason–
able grounds’ to believe that a probationer has contraband”), aff'd on other 
grounds, 438 U.S. 868 (1987). 
122.  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872–73. 
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B. The Precedent Cited by the Trilogy 
Although the balancing test featured in the Court’s three 
reasonableness-balancing model decisions differs from the balancing the 
Justices had previously done under the warrant-presumption model, the 
three opinions are not completely citationless. Nevertheless, aside from 
some general language supporting a balancing approach that appears 
in a few Supreme Court opinions, none of the case law cited by the 
Court departed substantially from the warrant-presumption model and 
the type of balancing described in the prior Section. 
In Knights, the Court relied on two precedents to support the 
balancing approach: the statement in Ohio v. Robinette that 
reasonableness inquiries require a totality-of-the-circumstances analy–
sis,123 and the balancing test articulated in Wyoming v. Houghton.124 
But these cases cannot do the work the Knights Court asked of them. 
 Ohio v. Robinette struck down a “bright-line” “per se rule” 
providing that consent to a search that was allegedly given after a 
lawful stop ended could not be considered voluntary unless the suspect 
had been informed she was free to leave.125 The Robinette majority did 
comment that “[r]easonableness” for Fourth Amendment purposes is 
“measured in objective terms” by looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, but the Court’s focus there was on its purportedly 
“‘traditional’” approach of “eschew[ing] bright-line rules” in Fourth 
Amendment cases.126 Although it has become something of a sport 
among criminal procedure scholars to point out how inconsistent the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions have been on the subject of 
bright-line rules,127 the issue in Robinette turned on the voluntariness of 
consent, and the Court rightly observed that it had consistently treated 
the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent as “a question of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances.”128 But examining the totality 
of the circumstances in analyzing one of the issues relevant in applying 
one of the categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement is very 
 
123. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 
(1996)). 
124. See id. at 118–19 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 
(1999)); see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2019) (similarly relying 
on Houghton). 
125. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36. 
126. Id. at 39 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)). 
127. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 71, 126 & n.267 (2007) (discussing scholarly treatment of 
this issue). 
128. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 248–49 (1973)). 
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different from letting the ad hoc balancing test articulated in Knights 
dictate the constitutionality of a search.129 
 Wyoming v. Houghton involved another exception to the warrant 
requirement—the automobile exception. In holding that the probable 
cause needed to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle authorized 
the police to search the belongings of a passenger,130 Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Houghton did set out his preferred originalist 
approach to Fourth Amendment issues: to ask first whether the search 
would have been permitted under the framing-era common law; and, if 
that question had “no answer,” to then assess the constitutionality of 
the search “under traditional standards of reasonableness” by using a 
balancing test.131 Admittedly, the other Justices in the majority went 
along with this language, with only Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion 
adding the caveat that “history is meant to inform, but not 
automatically to determine,” Fourth Amendment analysis.132 But the 
three dissenters objected that “[n]either the precedent cited by the 
Court, nor the majority’s opinion in this case, mandate that [two-step] 
approach.”133 In fact, the only support Justice Scalia cited for the 
 
129. See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
130. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999). 
131. Id. at 299–300; see also id. at 303 (“Even if the historical evidence . . . were 
thought to be equivocal, we would find that the balancing of the relative 
interests weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passenger’s 
belongings.”). For another illustration of Justice Scalia’s two-pronged app–
roach to Fourth Amendment questions, see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 
168, 171 (2008). 
132. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
133. Id. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 
13 (1985) (reasoning that, given the “sweeping change in the legal and 
technological context,” applying the common-law rule there would lead to “a 
mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry”); Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 & n.33 (1980) (explaining that the common 
law is “obviously relevant” but not “entirely dispositive” of what the Framers 
viewed as reasonable, and that the Justices had “not simply frozen into 
constitutional law” the prevailing law enforcement policies of the framing era); 
see also Friedman & Stein, supra note 24, at 296 (characterizing Houghton as 
“a new approach to the Fourth Amendment”); David A. Sklansky, The 
Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1760 
(2000) (describing Houghton as “embrac[ing]” “new Fourth Amendment 
originalism”). For discussion of a subsequent Supreme Court opinion rejecting 
an approach similar to that outlined in Houghton, see infra notes 259–265 and 
accompanying text. For criticism of the Court’s reliance on common law in 
some of its Fourth Amendment case law, see, for example, Thomas Y. Davies, 
Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal 
Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 Tex. 
Tech L. Rev. 51, 53 (2010) (charging that the Justices have reached 
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balancing test was an administrative inspection opinion, Vernonia 
School District 47J v. Acton,134 which, as discussed below, the Court 
would likewise rely on later in Maryland v. King.135 
Despite Justice Scalia’s reference to a balancing test, his opinion in 
Houghton fits squarely within the warrant-presumption model. The 
Court was applying its automobile exception precedents, in particular, 
the decision in United States v. Ross allowing police to open containers 
as part of a vehicle search.136 And, in weighing the relevant interests, 
Justice Scalia relied heavily on the rationales underlying the automobile 
exception: that vehicles trigger a reduced expectation of privacy,137 and 
their “ready mobility” creates a notion of exigency.138 As the dissent 
suggested, therefore, Houghton did not squarely endorse the substantial 
deviation from the warrant-presumption model adopted in Knights. 
Five years later, Knights did all the heavy lifting in Samson. Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion in Samson had to go no further than to cite 
Knights in characterizing the totality-of-the-circumstances balancing 
test as “our general Fourth Amendment approach.”139 The only other 
precedent that Samson arguably used to support the reasonableness-
 
decisions based on “the majority’s ideological predilections and then have 
sometimes advanced or concocted historical claims to justify their decisions”); 
Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and 
Legal Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 Miss. L.J. 1085, 
1131 (2012) (calling the “originalist approach to the Fourth Amendment 
based on specific founding-era practices . . . illogical and unwise” because “[a] 
search or seizure in 1791 took place in an institutional context so different 
from ours that it simply is not the same search or seizure it was then” and 
because “[t]he founders . . . understood the common law to be dynamic” and 
“[t]he language they chose was crafted against a background they expected 
to evolve”); and Sklansky, supra, at 1794 (noting that “the Fourth Amend–
ment does not codify eighteenth-century common law, and the available 
evidence suggests that was not its purpose,” and questioning whether the 
common law is a “secure tether for Fourth Amendment rights” given that, 
“[m]ore often than not, eighteenth-century ‘common law’ itself is wildly 
indeterminate”). 
134. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995)). 
135. See infra notes 149–155 and accompanying text. 
136. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 
824 (1982)). 
137. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 
138. Id. at 304 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985)). 
139. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (quoting United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). 
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balancing model was United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.140 In responding 
to the dissent’s argument that Supreme Court case law did not allow 
searches justified by neither individualized suspicion nor special 
needs,141 the Samson majority observed that “[t]he touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion,” 
and then, quoting Martinez-Fuerte, acknowledged that, although the 
Justices had often held that the “‘accommodat[ion]’” of “public and 
private interests” required “some quantum of individualized suspicion,” 
they had also said that the Fourth Amendment “‘imposes no irreducible 
requirement of such suspicion.’”142 
 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte involved immigration stops at 
fixed Border Patrol checkpoints and, like other administrative 
inspection cases, used a balancing test to evaluate the validity of the 
checkpoint questioning.143 In concluding that reasonable suspicion was 
not required to justify stopping a vehicle at a permanent immigration 
checkpoint, the Court relied on other administrative inspection cases, 
most notably Camara, which had allowed special needs searches 
without individualized suspicion so long as the inspection scheme 
included some other mechanism for limiting the discretion of the 
individual inspectors.144 Thus, even if the Samson Court was hoping to 
rely on Martinez-Fuerte for more than the proposition that the Fourth 
Amendment does not always require individualized suspicion, that 
precedent did not support resorting to a balancing test outside the 
administrative inspection context. 
In fact, the Samson majority seemed to concede this point, acknow–
ledging after quoting Martinez-Fuerte that the Justices had “only 
sanctioned suspicionless searches in limited circumstances, namely, 
 
140. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
141. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. at 855 n.4 (majority opinion) (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560–
61); see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013) (similarly relying 
on Martinez-Fuerte). 
143. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554–55. For a discussion of the balancing 
test used in special needs cases, see supra note 117 and accompanying 
text. 
144. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560–61 (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 
U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (permitting housing inspections based on an area 
warrant)); see also id. at 559 (reasoning that “[r]outine checkpoint stops . . . 
involve less discretionary enforcement activity”). See generally Kit Kinports, 
The Quantum of Suspicion Needed for an Exigent Circumstances Search, 52 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 615, 640 n.133 (2019) (observing that the Court’s 
special needs opinions have fluctuated between treating discretion minimi–
zation as a separate hurdle that administrative inspections must clear and 
as one of the factors to be considered in applying the balancing test). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
The Origins and Legacy of the Fourth Amendment                 
Reasonableness-balancing Model 
187 
programmatic and special needs searches.”145 Although Justice Thomas 
went on to say the Court had never held that these were “the only 
limited circumstances” in which suspicionless searches were permissible, 
the Samson Court thereby apparently recognized that Martinez-Fuerte 
and the administrative inspection line of cases were distinguishable and 
did not endorse the reasonableness-balancing model.146 
Admittedly, the Court seemed to make a greater effort to find 
precedent for the reasonableness-balancing model in Maryland v. King. 
In addition to mentioning some of the case law relied on in Knights and 
Samson,147 King cited four other opinions in support of the balancing 
approach and “addressed” the case before it with “this background” in 
mind.148 
 King started off with the statement in Vernonia School District 47J 
v. Acton that, “[a]s the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the 
ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 
reasonableness.”149 Acton was a special needs case challenging the drug 
testing of student athletes.150 Written by Justice Scalia, the majority 
opinion in Acton, like his later opinion for the Court in Wyoming v. 
Houghton, opened its Fourth Amendment analysis with a description of 
his preferred approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. After 
making the uncontroversial point the Court repeated in King, that the 
language of the Fourth Amendment makes reasonableness “the ultimate 
measure” of the validity of a search,151 the majority opinion in Acton 
continued in much the same vein as Houghton: “[a]t least in a case such 
as this, where there was no clear practice, either approving or 
disapproving the type of search at issue” when the Fourth Amendment 
was written, the reasonableness of the search must be evaluated by 
weighing the competing individual and governmental interests.152 But 
 
145. Samson, 547 U.S. at 855 n.4. 
146. Id. (emphasis added). 
147. See supra notes 124 & 142. 
148. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013). 
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)); see also id. at 462 (relying on the Acton 
Court’s comment that the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy “may 
depend upon the individual’s legal relationship with the State” (quoting 
Acton, 515 U.S. at 654)). 
150. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 648. 
151. Id. at 652. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 193–198 and 
accompanying text. 
152. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652–53 (emphasis added) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
654 (1979)). 
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the two opinions Acton cited here to support the balancing test, like 
Acton itself, involved administrative inspections.153 And the very next 
sentence in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Acton acknowledged the warrant-
presumption model, noting that “this Court has said that reason-
ableness generally requires” a warrant but that exceptions exist in, for 
example, special needs cases.154 Given that Acton was a special needs 
case, it is no surprise that the majority opinion went on to balance the 
competing interests in upholding the school district’s drug testing 
policy.155 But, as noted above with respect to Martinez-Fuerte, Acton 
does not support resorting to a balancing test beyond “a case such as 
this”—i.e., one that arises in the administrative inspection context. 
The majority opinion in King turned next to Illinois v. McArthur, 
including two quotations from that decision, which upheld the 
impoundment of a residence while police sought a search warrant.156 
Like Acton, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in McArthur began its 
analysis of the merits of the case by quoting the Fourth Amendment 
and then stating that “[i]ts ‘central requirement’ is one of reason–
ableness.”157 Again like Acton, McArthur acknowledged the warrant-
presumption model, noting that a warrant is required “in ‘the ordinary 
case.’”158 
In the language first quoted in King, Justice Breyer then pointed 
out that, “[w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished 
expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has 
found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a 
warrantless search or seizure reasonable.”159 The citations that followed 
this statement were all cases adhering to the warrant-presumption 
model,160 and the considerations it listed are precisely those the Court 
 
153. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633–34 (upholding the warrantless drug testing 
of certain railroad employees as a permissible administrative inspection); 
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (allowing highway safety automobile stops based 
on reasonable suspicion). 
154. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653. 
155. See id. at 654–64. 
156. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001). 
157. Id. at 330 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality 
opinion)). 
158. Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)). 
159. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447, 463 (2013) (quoting McArthur, 531 
U.S. at 330); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121–22 (2001) 
(quoting some of the same language from McArthur). 
160. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330–31 (citing Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 
938, 940–41 (1996) (per curiam) (automobile exception); Michigan Dep’t of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (administrative search); Place, 
462 U.S. at 706 (Terry seizure of luggage); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
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has taken into account in creating categorical exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.161 It is not obvious what other situations the phrase “or 
the like” was meant to refer to, or what the Court had in mind in 
suggesting a distinction between cases where “general” versus 
“individual” circumstances justify a warrantless intrusion. But this 
language does not evidence any clear intent to deviate from the 
warrant-presumption model or to allow law enforcement to proceed 
without a warrant because of the peculiar facts of a particular case—
beyond the situations where they have the requisite suspicion in an 
“individual” case needed, for example, to frisk a suspect or search a 
vehicle. Moreover, a recent Supreme Court opinion situated McArthur 
in the warrant-presumption model, pointing out that warrants are 
“normally required” and then quoting the sentence that preceded 
McArthur’s “or the like” statement for the proposition that “we have 
also ‘made it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.’”162 
The majority opinion in McArthur continued by finding that the 
impoundment of the defendant’s home was not “per se unreasonable” 
“[i]n the circumstances of the case before us.”163 Invoking a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the Court found “a 
plausible claim of . . . ‘exigent circumstances.’”164 After citing some of 
its exigent circumstances precedents and noting that the impoundment 
of McArthur’s residence was “tailored to that need,” the Court, in the 
second sentence quoted in King, mentioned the balancing test: “[c]onse–
quently, rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we 
 
692, 702–05 (1981) (detention during execution of search warrant); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk)). 
161. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (tying the 
warrant exception for administrative searches to special needs); California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391–92 (1985) (noting that the automobile exception is 
premised in part on the reduced expectation of privacy surrounding vehicles); 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25–26 (reasoning that a stop and frisk is less intrusive than 
an arrest and full search in justifying the stop-and-frisk exception). 
162. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330); see also Akinmboni v. United States, 
126 A.3d 694, 697 (D.C. 2015) (similarly aligning McArthur with the warrant-
presumption model). But see State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 375 (Kan. 2016) 
(interpreting McArthur’s language as illustrating “general reasonableness”); 
State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 796, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (likewise 
suggesting that this language allows warrantless searches that do not come 
“within a recognized [warrant] exception”). For further discussion of Ryce and 
Villarreal, see infra notes 322–329 and accompanying text. 
163. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331. 
164. Id. 
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balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to 
determine if the intrusion was reasonable.”165 
But the two cases McArthur cited in support of that balancing test 
were both special needs cases.166 Moreover, although this sentence from 
McArthur arguably provides some precedent for the reasonableness-
balancing model, the Court did not deviate substantially from the 
warrant-presumption model there. Instead, the Court followed other 
exigent circumstances cases in which, in McArthur’s words, the Justices 
had allowed “temporary restraints” that were necessary to protect 
evidence until a warrant could be secured.167 Finally, to the extent that 
some language in McArthur offers some support for the reasonableness-
balancing model, the Court in that case made the same error repeated 
later in Samson by relying on the balancing test applied, under the 
warrant-presumption model, exclusively in administrative inspection 
cases. 
Immediately following King’s first quotation from McArthur about 
the “circumstances” that justify warrantless searches, the majority 
opinion in King quoted Maryland v. Buie for the proposition that 
“[t]hose circumstances diminish the need for a warrant” in several 
situations, such as when “‘the public interest is such that neither a 
warrant nor probable cause is required.’”168 When read in context, 
however, the Buie Court was simply explaining the conditions under 
which the Court has recognized categorical exceptions to the “general[]” 
warrant requirement, and the cases it cited were all following the 
warrant-presumption model.169 
Interestingly, King did not rely on Buie’s statement at the 
beginning of the same paragraph that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
only unreasonable searches and seizures and “[o]ur cases show” that the 
Court has applied the balancing test “in determining reasonableness.”170 
 
165. Id., quoted in Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448, 463 (2013). 
166. See id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (using the 
balancing test in evaluating highway safety automobile stops); United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877–78 (1975) (applying the test in a case 
involving immigration automobile stops near the border)). 
167. Id. at 334. 
168. King, 569 U.S. at 447 (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)). 
As examples of other circumstances that authorize warrantless searches, 
King cited Samson along with several Supreme Court precedents recognizing 
warrant exceptions under the warrant-presumption model. See id. 
169. Buie, 494 U.S. at 331 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 619–20 (1989) (administrative search); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 873 (1987) (same); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985) 
(same); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (stop and frisk)). 
170. Id. 
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But both precedents Buie cited in support of balancing were special 
needs cases.171 Moreover, in holding that law enforcement officials may 
conduct “cursory” protective sweeps when they have reasonable 
suspicion to believe “an individual posing a danger” to them is on the 
premises, the Buie Court rejected the State’s contention that “a general 
reasonableness balancing test” ought to permit protective sweeps 
whenever police enter a home to make an arrest for a violent crime.172 
Instead, the Court adopted the “alternative” argument that a protec–
tive sweep “fall[s] within the ambit” of the Terry line of cases and 
should therefore be governed by “a Terry-type standard” of reasonable 
suspicion.173 Quoting the balancing analysis articulated in Terry, the 
Buie Court thought that the “balance struck” in Terry and its progeny 
was equally applicable to protective sweeps.174 Buie therefore fits 
squarely in the warrant-presumption model camp, following in Terry’s 
footsteps and recognizing a categorical exception to the warrant 
requirement.175 
As the fourth and final source of support for the reasonableness-
balancing model, King quoted the statement in New Jersey v. T.L.O 
that, “[a]lthough the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment 
is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable 
depends on the context within which a search takes place.”176 In T.L.O., 
the Court allowed school officials to conduct an administrative 
inspection of a high school student’s purse based on “reasonable 
grounds for suspecting” the search would lead to evidence the student 
 
171. See id. (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 
(1983) (customs search); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653–54 (highway safety stop)). 
172. Id. at 335, 334, 330 (also allowing automatic, suspicionless sweeps of “spaces 
immediately adjoining the place of arrest” as part of a search incident to 
arrest). 
173. Id. at 330. 
174. Id. at 332; see also id. at 331 (describing Terry as “most instructive for 
present purposes”); id. at 334 (concluding that the “balance” adopted in the 
Terry line of cases was also “the proper one” there). 
175. But see United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(asserting that Buie was resolved on “the same general reasonableness[] 
balancing test” articulated in Knights, and applying that “balancing prin–
ciple” in holding that protective sweeps are not confined to searches incident 
to arrest), overruled on other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 
(2011). But see United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(agreeing that Buie did not suggest an arrest was “a mandatory prerequisite” 
for a protective sweep, without mentioning a balancing test and in fact 
pointing out that Buie was “based upon the reasoning set forth” in the Terry 
line of cases). 
176. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461–62 (2013) (quoting New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)). 
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had violated either the law or school rules.177 After the sentence quoted 
in King about the importance of “context” in determining the 
reasonableness of a search, the T.L.O. Court noted that “[t]he deter–
mination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class 
of searches” necessitates application of Camara’s balancing test.178 
Elsewhere the T.L.O. opinion similarly discussed the balancing test179 
and the need to assess “the legality of a search of a student . . . 
depend[ing] simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, 
of the search.”180 But T.L.O. involved an administrative inspection—a 
search performed by school personnel, not law enforcement, and 
designed to serve the special need of “maintaining security and order in 
the schools.”181 And the only precedents cited to support either a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach or a balancing test were other 
administrative search cases and Terry,182 which illustrates, as discussed 
above,183 the Court’s use of a balancing approach in analyzing whether 
to create a new categorical exception to the warrant requirement. While 
the Court’s more general statements in T.L.O. might be read to offer 
some support for the reasonableness-balancing model, today T.L.O. is 
viewed as a straightforward administrative inspection case184 and 
therefore cannot be read to justify a more expansive use of the balancing 
test. 
Of the seven precedents the Court cited in Knights, Samson, and 
King to support the reasonableness-balancing model,185 four—Robinette, 
Martinez-Fuerte, Acton, and Buie—are clearly distinguishable. At best, 
then, the other three opinions—Houghton, McArthur, and T.L.O.—
 
177. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42. 
178. Id. at 337 (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
179. See id. at 341 (“Where a careful balancing of governmental and private 
interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amend–
ment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have 
not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 340. 
182. See id. at 341–42. 
183. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
184. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (citing T.L.O. for 
the proposition that “‘special needs’ inhere in the public school context”); 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 n.15 (2001) (aligning T.L.O. 
with the special needs cases); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 653 (1995) (describing T.L.O. as a case finding “‘special needs’ to exist 
in the public school context”). 
185. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447–48, 461–63 (2013); Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848–50, 855 n.4 (2006); United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001). 
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include some general language supporting the use of a balancing 
approach to evaluate the constitutionality of warrantless searches. But 
T.L.O. involved an administrative inspection, and all three opinions 
derived their support for a balancing analysis exclusively from Terry 
and the special needs cases. Moreover, aside from their references to a 
balancing test, Houghton and McArthur did not depart substantially 
from the warrant-presumption model. While the constitutionality of 
administrative inspection schemes does turn on a balancing test, the 
precedent the Supreme Court cited in the reasonableness-balancing 
model trilogy does not provide much support for extending the 
balancing analysis beyond the confines of that particular warrant 
exception. 
C. Other Possible Sources of Support 
If the Court had scant precedent to offer in support of the 
reasonableness-balancing model in Knights, Samson, and King, did the 
Justices miss anything? Is there any other Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence they could have cited? In exploring that question, this 
Section considers first other Supreme Court opinions that have used the 
touchstone mantra and then additional precedents relied on by others 
advocating for the balancing model. Here again, general language can 
be found in a few opinions that arguably refers to an ad hoc balancing 
test, but even those cases do not provide a great deal of support for 
that approach because, for example, they rely on warrant-presumption 
model precedent or do not stray far from that model. 
The three reasonableness-balancing model opinions were not the 
first Supreme Court decisions to refer to “reasonableness” as “the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.”186 But, with the exception of 
the balancing model trilogy, no Supreme Court opinion that has used 
the “touchstone” phrase has applied, or endorsed, a balancing approach 
in assessing the permissibility of law enforcement activities beyond the 
confines of the warrant-presumption model. 
The language initially appeared in a Supreme Court opinion in 
1971, in Hill v. California.187 The phrase “touchstone of reasonableness” 
was used there to make clear that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require “certainty” and that probable cause can exist even where police 
turn out to be mistaken.188 Hill’s discussion of probable cause therefore 
 
186. King, 569 U.S. at 448; Samson, 547 U.S. at 855 n.4; Knights, 534 U.S. at 
118. 
187. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
188. Id. at 804. For other opinions using the phrase to similar effect, see Heien 
v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014), Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
177, 184–86 (1990), Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1985), and 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985). 
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provides no support for using an ad hoc balancing test to resolve the 
constitutionality of law enforcement searches and seizures. 
Touchstone language was next used in the Court’s 1977 per curiam 
opinion in Pennsylvania v. Mimms.189 Mimms involved a traffic stop, 
and the Court held there that police are allowed to require the driver 
of a lawfully stopped vehicle to exit from the car.190 Quoting Terry, the 
Court observed that “[t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of 
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’”191 
The Court then cited one of its administrative inspection opinions for 
the proposition that reasonableness turns on a balancing of the relevant 
government and individual interests.192 Thus, Mimms was evaluating 
the permissible scope of a Terry-like stop, and it does not support the 
use of a balancing test beyond the confines discussed above: in resolving 
the constitutionality of special needs searches, and in ruling on the 
creation and scope of categorical warrant exceptions. 
The next Supreme Court opinion to use the “touchstone” language 
in a different context was the 1991 ruling in Florida v. Jimeno.193 To 
start off its substantive Fourth Amendment analysis, the Jimeno Court 
observed that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”194 The Court then went on to say: “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; 
it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”195 In support of the 
“touchstone” sentence, the Court cited Katz v. United States.196 
Although the Court offered no explanation for the citation, presumably 
it was referring to the portion of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz 
that defined a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes as a violation 
 
189. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (per curiam). 
190. See id. at 111. 
191. Id. at 108–09 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). For the original 
context in which this language appeared in Terry, see supra note 98 and 
accompanying text. For other opinions in the Terry line of cases making 
similar use of the touchstone clause, see Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 
411 (1997), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983). 
192. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). For a similar opinion, see Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411–
12. 
193. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. For similar language, see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 652 (1995), discussed supra notes 149–155 and accompanying text. 
196. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360 (1967)). 
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of one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” and therefore had nothing 
to do with what constitutes a “reasonable” search.197 Moreover, reading 
the two consecutive sentences in Jimeno together suggests a different 
interpretation of the “touchstone” language, the point that only 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures are forbidden by the Fourth 
Amendment. But this straightforward observation is self-evident—after 
all, what the Reasonableness Clause prohibits are “unreasonable 
searches and seizures”198—and therefore does not help justify a 
reasonableness-balancing approach. 
The “touchstone” phrase also appeared in the Court’s brief 
discussion of the knock-and-announce rule in United States v. 
Ramirez.199 Citing Mimms, the Ramirez Court observed that “[t]he 
general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment 
analysis . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant.”200 The 
Court arguably went on to use balancing-type language in saying that 
the Constitution may prohibit “[e]xcessive or unnecessary destruction 
of property” following a lawful entry, but the Court did not engage in 
any sort of explicit balancing analysis in Ramirez.201 Rather, the Court 
applied its precedents allowing no-knock entries when police have 
reasonable suspicion that knocking would be dangerous and then 
concluded that the officers had a good reason for breaking a garage 
window to enter Ramirez’s home and therefore their “manner” of entry 
was “clearly reasonable.”202 Although the Court did not elaborate 
further or cite any support, its reasoning seems reminiscent of the 
excessive force cases, which have similarly made clear that the Fourth 
Amendment governs not just “when” but also “how” a seizure (here, 
entry) is made and have instructed judges to determine whether a 
 
197. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis 
is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation 
of privacy.’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))); Oliver 
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“Since Katz . . . , the touchstone 
of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has 
a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (quoting 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
198. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
199. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998). 
200. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (per curiam)). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 71–72. 
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particular use of force was “objectively unreasonable” under the totality 
of the circumstances.203 
The “touchstone” language was then featured in a school drug 
testing case, Board of Education v. Earls, where the Court noted that 
“‘reasonableness’ . . . is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search.”204 Although Justice Thomas’s majority opinion 
in Earls asserted that the Court “generally determine[s] the reason–
ableness of a search” by balancing, this language appeared in his 
discussion of searches that are “not in any way related to the conduct 
of criminal investigations” and the only cases cited in support of the 
balancing test were—like Earls itself—other administrative inspection 
cases.205 
Ironically, the next Supreme Court opinion to use the “touchstone” 
phrase did so in the context of explaining the warrant-presumption 
model. In Brigham City v. Stuart, which involved the warrant exception 
for exigent circumstances, the Court, after noting that warrantless 
intrusions are “‘presumptively unreasonable,’” pointed out that, 
“[n]evertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to 
certain exceptions.”206 This use of the phrase, which the Court has 
repeated on several occasions,207 directly supports the warrant-
presumption model instead of the reasonableness-balancing model.208 
Thus, none of the other Supreme Court opinions in which the 
“touchstone” mantra appeared furnish much of a basis for using a 
freewheeling balancing analysis to test the constitutionality of searches 
and seizures. All of those cases seem to fit comfortably within the 
warrant-presumption model and restrict the balancing approach to 
either evaluating administrative inspections or ruling on the creation 
and scope of categorical warrant exceptions. The remainder of this 
Section turns to other potential sources of support for the 
 
203. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 397 (1989) (emphasis omitted). For 
discussion of the excessive force cases, see supra notes 110–114 and accom–
panying text. 
204. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002). 
205. Id. at 829. 
206. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)). 
207. See Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S. 141, 167 (2013); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011); 
Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam). 
208. But see Murphy, supra note 8, at 184 n.160, 184–85 (interpreting this 
language as “adopting the disjunctive” view of the relationship between the 
Fourth Amendment’s two clauses and giving “reasonableness . . . equal 
footing with . . . the warrant presumption”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
The Origins and Legacy of the Fourth Amendment                 
Reasonableness-balancing Model 
197 
reasonableness-balancing model raised by the parties in Maryland v. 
King. 
The State of Maryland’s reply brief in King cited two additional 
administrative inspection opinions: Ferguson v. City of Charleston209 
and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.210 After quoting the 
language from Martinez-Fuerte discussed above, which pointed out that 
the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily require individualized 
suspicion,211 the State inserted a “see also” citation to Ferguson and 
Sitz.212 But the Supreme Court wisely chose not to rely on either of 
those opinions in King. 
The State’s reply brief quoted Ferguson as purportedly 
“acknowledging that warrantless searches for law enforcement purposes 
may be acceptable even without probable cause when the individuals 
to be searched ‘have a lesser expectation of privacy than the public at 
large.’”213 In Ferguson, the Court struck down a policy of drug testing 
pregnant women because it was “designed to obtain evidence of criminal 
conduct . . . that would be turned over to the police” and therefore did 
not qualify as a special needs search.214 In the footnote cited by the 
State, the majority was responding to the dissent’s reliance on Griffin 
v. Wisconsin215 for the proposition that “the special needs doctrine ‘is 
ordinarily employed . . . to enable searches by law enforcement officials 
who . . . ordinarily have a law enforcement objective.’”216 In rejecting 
that argument, the Ferguson majority distinguished Griffin on a 
number of grounds, most notably, that a probation officer is different 
from “the police officer who normally conducts searches against the 
ordinary citizen.”217 
The “[f]inal[]” distinguishing feature Ferguson pointed to, in the 
part of the opinion quoted by Maryland’s reply brief, was that “Griffin 
is properly read as limited by the fact that probationers have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than the public at large.”218 But Griffin’s reliance 
on probationers’ reduced expectation of privacy is typical of the  
209. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
210. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
211. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
212. See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 78, at 6. 
213. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80 n.15). 
214. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70, 86. 
215. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
216. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (emphasis omitted) (quoting id. at 100 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
217. Id. (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876). 
218. Id. (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874–75). 
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balancing seen in the Supreme Court’s special needs precedents, which 
often make similar points in minimizing the invasiveness of the 
administrative search in question.219 Ferguson stressed the importance 
of a special need in striking down the drug testing program there, and 
its discussion of Griffin does not, as the State of Maryland argued, 
suggest that either opinion envisioned that diminished expectations of 
privacy could justify suspicionless searches for “law enforcement 
purposes” that fall outside the context of administrative inspections. 
In addition to Ferguson, the State’s reply brief in Maryland v. King 
quoted Sitz, another administrative inspection case, as rejecting the 
“requirement to show [a] ‘special need’ search before engaging in [a] 
balancing test.”220 This is a bit more complicated. Sitz applied a 
balancing test in upholding the constitutionality of a sobriety 
checkpoint,221 and the language quoted by the State—the Court’s use 
of the two words “special need”—appeared in the context of the Court’s 
reply to the respondents’ argument that the balancing test the Court 
had applied in Brown v. Texas “was not the proper method of analysis” 
and that some individualized suspicion was required before a vehicle 
could be stopped at a DUI checkpoint.222 Sitz continued summarizing 
the respondents’ contentions as follows: “[r]espondents argue that there 
must be a showing of some special governmental need ‘beyond the 
normal need’ for criminal law enforcement before a balancing analysis 
is appropriate, and that petitioners have demonstrated no such special 
need.”223 “But,” the Court responded, apparently rejecting some or all 
of the respondents’ points, the special needs precedents were not 
“designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing with police stops of 
motorists on public highways”224: Martinez-Fuerte225 and Brown v. 
 
219. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–32 (2002) (students); Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989) (Customs 
Service employees). Given the pervasiveness of this reasoning in the Court’s 
special needs decisions, the King majority’s effort to distance special needs 
searches from DNA testing of arrestees on the grounds that the former 
“intrude upon substantial expectations of privacy” was somewhat myster–
ious. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462–63 (2013). 
220. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 78, at 6 (quoting Michigan Dep’t of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990)); see also Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 71, at 14 (making 
the same argument); cf. 4 LaFave, supra note 47, § 9.7(b), at 979 (agreeing 
with this argument but only as applied to “highway checkpoints”). 
221. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. 
222. Id. at 449. 
223. Id. at 450 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665). 
224. Id. (emphasis added). 
225. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
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Texas.226 Those two opinions, the Sitz Court said, “utilized a balancing 
analysis” and “are the relevant authorities here.”227 
Although Sitz did not then use the term “special needs” in 
upholding Michigan’s sobriety checkpoints, it did explain that the 
checkpoints were designed to alleviate the “serious public danger” that 
had been created by “the drunken driving problem” and had led to 
“‘increasing slaughter on our highways.’”228 This is essentially a special 
needs argument, as the Court later recognized in City of Indianapolis 
v. Edmond, referring to the checkpoints in Sitz as addressing a “highway 
safety concern,” an “immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and 
limb.”229 Therefore, the Court concluded in Edmond, the sobriety 
checkpoints in Sitz were not “designed primarily to serve the general 
interest in crime control” even though they had “the same ultimate 
purpose of arresting those suspected of committing crimes.”230 And 
Edmond struck down the narcotics checkpoint at issue there on the 
grounds that its “primary purpose,” unlike a sobriety checkpoint, was 
“to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”231 Thus, 
whatever part of the respondents’ argument the Sitz Court meant to 
repudiate by the ambiguous word “[b]ut,” Edmond’s treatment of Sitz 
as a special needs case suggests—contrary to the State of Maryland’s 
reading of Sitz—that a special need outside “the general interest in 
crime control” is critical to trigger a balancing analysis.232 
Moreover, the two opinions the Sitz Court called “the relevant 
authorities” on highway stops were Martinez-Fuerte, the administrative 
inspection case that, as discussed above, used the balancing test in 
upholding immigration stops at fixed Border Patrol checkpoints,233 and 
 
226. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
227. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450. 
228. Id. at 451, 453 (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957)). 
229. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000); see also Illinois 
v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (describing the checkpoint in Sitz as 
serving “special law enforcement concerns”); 4 LaFave, supra note 47, 
§ 9.7, at 968 (pointing out that sobriety checkpoints are “best viewed” as 
administrative searches). 
230. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42; see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 
67, 83 n.21 (2001) (noting that special needs searches may lead to a “discovery 
of evidence” that is “merely incidental to the purposes of the administrative 
search”). 
231. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. 
232. Id. at 42–43. 
233. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554–55 (1976). For discussion 
of Martinez-Fuerte, see supra notes 140–146 and accompanying text. 
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Brown v. Texas, which involved a Terry stop.234 So what support does 
the Court’s brief opinion in Brown offer to the State of Maryland’s 
argument that balancing can occur outside the confines of the special 
needs cases? 
The reasonableness of a seizure short of an arrest turns on a 
balancing test, the Court said in Brown, identifying three factors to be 
“weigh[ed]” in determining the permissibility of the seizure: the 
“gravity” of the law enforcement interest; “the degree to which the 
seizure advances” that interest; and the “severity” of the intrusion.235 
In support of the appropriateness of a balancing analysis and these three 
factors, Brown cited Terry,236 Pennsylvania v. Mimms,237 United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, an administrative inspection case involving 
immigration automobile stops near the border,238 and Dunaway v. New 
York.239 
As discussed above, the first three opinions do not support use of a 
balancing approach outside the confines of the warrant-presumption 
model: to evaluate the constitutionality of special needs searches and 
to decide on the creation and scope of the warrant exceptions. And 
Dunaway, in holding that police needed probable cause to take a suspect 
to the station for questioning,240 expressly refused to extend the “narrow 
scope” of the Terry “balancing test” and to “adopt a multifactor 
balancing test of ‘reasonable police conduct under the circumstances’” 
to evaluate the constitutionality of seizures that do not rise to the level 
of arrests.241 The cases cited in Brown therefore do not provide much 
support for the reasonableness-balancing model. 
 
234. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979). 
235. Id. at 51. But see Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 459 (2013) (distinguishing, 
in contrast to the second Brown factor, between the “constitutionality” of a 
search and the “efficacy” of a search “for its purpose”). 
236. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). For 
discussion of Terry, see supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
237. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 
(1977) (per curiam)). For discussion of Mimms, see supra notes 189–192 and 
accompanying text. 
238. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50–51 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 878–83 (1975)); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
239. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209–
10 (1979)). 
240. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216. 
241. Id. at 210, 213; see id. at 214 (arguing that “the requisite ‘balancing’” had 
already been done in “centuries of precedent” requiring probable cause for 
seizures); see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815–16 (1985) (likewise 
holding that a suspect may not be transported to the police station for 
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Moreover, even the Brown Court itself did not stray far from the 
warrant-presumption model. Immediately after laying out its three 
factors, Brown cautioned, using standard warrant-presumption model 
language, that the need to prevent the “unfettered discretion of officers 
in the field” dictated that Fourth Amendment seizures must be based 
either on the reasonable suspicion required by Terry or, channeling the 
special needs cases, on “a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations 
on the conduct of individual officers.”242 Although the Court then went 
on to briefly mention two of the three factors,243 the focus of its analysis 
was the finding that the seizure in that case was impermissible because 
the police lacked reasonable suspicion.244 Thus, while Brown arguably 
purported to adopt a balancing approach, the opinion reads much like 
a warrant-presumption model decision—either addressing the permiss-
ible scope of a stop and frisk along the same lines as Terry and Mimms, 
or simply applying the stop-and-frisk analysis to the facts of the case.245 
The Court applied the three Brown factors not only in Sitz,246 but 
also in a later checkpoint case, Illinois v. Lidster,247 which was cited in 
the Solicitor General’s brief in Maryland v. King. The brief quoted 
Lidster to support the argument that a warrant is unnecessary when a 
police intrusion “is not the kind of event that involves suspicion, or lack 
of suspicion, of the relevant individual.”248 At issue in Lidster was the 
constitutionality of a highway checkpoint that was set up at the site of 
a recent hit-and-run to ask passing motorists whether they had any 
 
purposes of fingerprinting without probable cause); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U.S. 721, 727–28 (1969) (same). 
242. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558–62 (1976)). 
243. See id. at 52 (reasoning that preventing crime is a “weighty social objec–
tive,” and assuming that interest is “served to some degree” by a stop that 
is not supported by reasonable suspicion). 
244. See id. at 51–52; see also id. at 53 (explaining, in summarizing its holding, 
that Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the police did 
not have reasonable suspicion to stop him). 
245. Cf. 4 LaFave, supra note 47, § 9.7(b), at 979–80 (observing that 
Indianapolis’s narcotics checkpoint might have survived an “unadorned” 
Brown approach but faltered under Edmond’s later inclusion of the “addit–
ional requirement” of a purpose beyond general crime control). Interestingly, 
the Edmond majority did not cite Brown, although it featured prominently 
in the dissent. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 49–50, 53–54 
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
246. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451–55 (1990). 
247. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
248. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 71, at 32 (quoting Lidster, 540 U.S. at 425). 
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information about the accident.249 The Court found that the checkpoint 
satisfied Edmond’s requirement of a special need divorced from “general 
‘crime control’ purposes,” reasoning that “the phrase ‘general interest 
in crime control’ does not refer to every ‘law enforcement’ objective” 
and the “primary law enforcement purpose” of “information-seeking 
highway stops” was “not to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants 
were committing a crime” but instead to seek their assistance in 
“apprehend[ing] . . . other individuals.”250 Citing Martinez-Fuerte and 
Sitz, the Lidster Court noted that it had previously upheld other 
checkpoints that served “special law enforcement concerns,” and then, 
in the part of the opinion referenced by the Solicitor General, pointed 
out that, “by definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has 
little role to play” when law enforcement officials are simply seeking 
information from the public.251 The Court went on to uphold the 
constitutionality of the hit-and-run checkpoint under the three-factor 
balancing test articulated in Brown v. Texas.252 
One scholar has argued that Lidster, like Samson, is an example of 
“free-form balancing” outside the special needs context because the 
information-seeking checkpoint in Lidster was designed “to discover 
evidence of a crime” and therefore “canonical law enforcement 
activity.”253 But, as noted above, the Court aligned the Lidster check–
point with the special needs immigration and sobriety checkpoints, and 
seemed to find that a special need arises “when police ‘expect[]’ the 
seizure of [a] witness ‘to help them apprehend . . . other individuals’” 
rather than “the witness herself.”254 Moreover, even though Lidster 
ended up applying the three-factor Brown test, the balancing analysis 
required by Brown is functionally indistinguishable from the weighing 
of government versus private interests that is typically done in the 
administrative inspection cases.255 Thus, Lidster is “conventionally” 
 
249. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 421. 
250. Id. at 423–24 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 44 n.1). 
251. Id. at 424. 
252. See id. at 426–28. 
253. Kaye, supra note 33, at 552, 551 n.98. 
254. Kit Kinports, Camreta and Al-Kidd: The Supreme Court, the Fourth 
Amendment, and Witnesses, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 283, 306 (2012) 
(first alteration in original) (quoting Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423). But see George 
M. Dery, III & Kevin Meehan, Making the Roadblock a “Routine Part of 
American Life:” Illinois v. Lidster’s Extension of Police Checkpoint Power, 32 
Am. J. Crim. L. 105, 118 (2004) (taking the position that the Court “stopped 
short” of finding a special need in Lidster). 
255. For examples of administrative inspection opinions in which the Court 
impliedly incorporated the three Brown factors in its balancing analysis, see 
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002) (taking into account the 
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viewed as a special needs case, and not an application of an ad hoc 
balancing test.256 
In short, the Justices do not seem to have overlooked much helpful 
precedent in their reasonableness-balancing model decisions. The other 
Supreme Court opinions that have used the touchstone mantra did not 
apply a balancing test outside the confines of the warrant-presumption 
model, and the additional Supreme Court decisions suggested by others 
are likewise of little assistance.257 Just like the case law cited in the 
Supreme Court’s trilogy, at best one can find brief general language in 
a few opinions—Sitz and Brown—supporting the balancing model. But 
even those cases are problematic: their reasoning is vague; they ground 
the balancing test solely on warrant-presumption model cases; or they 
do not stray far from the warrant-presumption model. Thus, those 
decisions do not provide a solid foundation for using a balancing test 
other than to evaluate the constitutionality of special needs searches 
and to rule on the creation and scope of categorical warrant exceptions. 
D. Cases Going the Other Way 
The Court’s three reasonableness-balancing model opinions were 
not only unable to find much in the way of precedent that affirmatively 
endorsed an ad hoc balancing approach, but they also ignored several 
decisions that refused to engage in a balancing analysis.258 One of those 
cases, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, was decided eight months before 
 
“minimally intrusive nature” of the drug tests, “the nature and immediacy 
of the government’s concerns,” and “the efficacy” of the drug testing policy 
“in meeting them”), and Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) 
(considering what public interests housing inspections further, how intrusive 
they are, and also whether “any other canvassing technique would achieve 
acceptable results”). 
256. Kaye, supra note 33, at 552 n.117 (citing other sources). For further 
discussion of these roadblock cases, see infra notes 456–477 and accompan–
ying text. 
257. For discussion of a lower court opinion relying on United States v. Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. 109 (1984), to support a balancing analysis, see infra notes 450–
452 and accompanying text. 
258. Cf. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (quoting Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), only on the general irrelevance of 
police officer motivation in Fourth Amendment analysis). For discussion of 
Whren, see infra notes 266–271 and accompanying text. For other examples 
of cases in which the Court declined to adopt a balancing approach, see 
Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 201–02 (2013), Arizona v. Hicks, 480 
U.S. 321, 328–29 (1987), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211–12 
(1979). For discussion of these three cases, see supra notes 104–109, 239–
241 and accompanying text and infra note 452 and accompanying text. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
The Origins and Legacy of the Fourth Amendment                 
Reasonableness-balancing Model 
204 
Knights.259 Interestingly, it was the arrestee in Atwater who urged the 
Court to apply a balancing test and forbid custodial arrests for minor 
offenses that carry no prison sentence and create “no compelling need 
for immediate detention.”260 And the dissenting Justices agreed, 
invoking the touchstone mantra and Wyoming v. Houghton’s two-step 
approach and noting that, “in determining reasonableness, ‘[e]ach case 
is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.’”261 
But the majority, referencing the two-step originalist approach 
Justice Scalia outlined in Houghton and Vernonia School District 47J 
v. Acton, responded that Atwater was requesting “a new rule of 
constitutional law” based on the view that, when history “fails to speak 
conclusively,” judges are free to balance governmental and individual 
interests “by subjecting particular contemporary circumstances to 
traditional standards of reasonableness.”262 Although the Court 
acknowledged that “Atwater might well prevail” if a balancing test were 
applied to the facts of her case, the majority cautioned that it had 
“traditionally” hesitated to say that a “responsible Fourth Amendment 
balance” is “well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case 
determinations of government need.”263 Rather, the Court observed, 
“the object in implementing [the Fourth Amendment’s] command of 
reasonableness” is to devise “clear and simple” rules that can be 
“applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing,” and 
therefore judges “attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment 
balance . . . credit the government’s side with an essential interest in 
readily administrable rules.”264 The Court concluded by describing 
“current doctrine” as expressing a “preference for categorical treatment 
of Fourth Amendment claims” rather than “individualized review,” 
quoting Dunaway v. New York in holding that the probable cause 
requirement governs “‘all arrests, without the need to “balance” the 
 
259. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
260. Id. at 346. 
261. Id. at 360–61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)); see also 
id. at 366 (taking the position that the Fourth Amendment requires 
issuance of a citation for a fine-only offense absent “‘specific and articulable 
facts which . . . reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion’ of a full 
custodial arrest” (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21 (1968))). 
262. Id. at 345–46 (majority opinion) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 299–300 (1999); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–
53 (1995)). For discussion of these two cases, see supra notes 130–138, 149–
155 and accompanying text. 
263. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346–47. 
264. Id. at 347. 
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interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.’”265 
Atwater’s characterization of the balancing test as a “new rule” that 
contravened “current doctrine” therefore evidences the lack of prece–
dential support for the reasonableness-balancing model. 
The defendants similarly urged the Justices to use a balancing 
approach in Whren v. United States, arguing that “the balancing 
inherent in any Fourth Amendment inquiry” called for “weigh[ing] the 
governmental and individual interests implicated” in that case.266 In 
rejecting that approach and allowing undercover narcotics officers to 
make a seemingly pretextual traffic stop, a unanimous Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Scalia, refused to take the bait and engage 
in a “detailed ‘balancing’ analysis.”267 The Court agreed that “in 
principle” all Fourth Amendment cases “turn[] upon a ‘reasonableness’ 
determination” and therefore “involve[] a balancing of all relevant 
factors,” and Justice Scalia cited some of the special needs cases as 
illustrations of opinions that performed an “actual ‘balancing’ analy–
sis.”268 But the Court responded to the defendants’ call for a balancing 
test by maintaining that, “[w]ith rare exceptions not applicable here, . . 
. the result of that balancing is not in doubt” when a search or seizure 
is supported by probable cause.269 
The “only” Supreme Court opinions that “actually . . . perform[ed] 
the ‘balancing’ analysis” in the face of probable cause, Whren 
continued, involved intrusions “conducted in an extraordinary manner, 
unusually harmful to an individual’s privacy or even physical inter–
ests.”270 The Whren Court, then, seemed to view the balancing test as 
 
265. Id. at 352, 354 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). 
266. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816 (1996). 
267. Id. at 808–09, 818. 
268. Id. at 817–18 (citing Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648, 654–55, 659, 661 
(1979) (highway safety stop); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 556–62 (1976) (immigration checkpoint); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882–84 (1975) (immigration stops near the border)). 
269. Id. at 817; see also id. at 818 (“[T]he usual rule [is] that probable cause to 
believe the law has been broken ‘outbalances’ private interest in avoiding 
police contact.”).  
270. Id. at 818. Two of the four opinions Whren cited here as examples of cases 
that turned on a balancing analysis outside the special needs context fit 
clearly within the warrant-presumption framework. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 
514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (recognizing possible exceptions to the knock-and-
announce rule modeled on the warrant exception for exigent circumstances); 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (setting out the limits on the use 
of deadly force to catch a fleeing felon). The other two decisions suggest, 
unlike the reasonableness-balancing model, that in rare cases a balancing of 
the competing interests may protect defendants from intrusive invasions that 
would otherwise be permissible under the warrant-presumption model. See 
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a one-way ratchet, confining it to cases where the Justices are asked to 
determine the constitutionality of “extreme [law enforcement] 
practice[s],” and the Court found “no realistic alternative” to resolving 
“run-of-the-mine” Fourth Amendment cases other than by applying 
fixed rules, in Whren’s case, “the traditional common-law rule that 
probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”271 Whren, like Atwater, 
therefore reflects a Court hesitant to adopt a freewheeling balancing 
test to resolve the constitutionality of Fourth Amendment searches and 
seizures. 
This review of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law—
the opinions the Court cited in the reasonableness-balancing model 
trilogy as well as other possible precedent for a balancing approach—
suggests, contrary to the views advanced by some scholars and in the 
three opinions themselves, that the Court did in fact introduce a new 
approach when it balanced the governmental and individual interests 
in evaluating the constitutionality of the law enforcement search of 
Knights’s home. The Court had previously weighed the relevant 
competing interests in earlier cases, but that balancing was typically 
done within the framework of the warrant-presumption model and was 
confined to the special needs context and cases ruling on the creation 
and scope of the categorical warrant exceptions. And the few Supreme 
Court opinions that included general language suggesting a bigger role 
for the balancing test derived support exclusively from warrant-
presumption model cases or did not stray far from that model. 
This is not to say that the Supreme Court decisions addressing 
warrant exceptions are a model of clarity and easy to catalogue, or to 
deny that they are subjective and open to question.272 If anything, the 
preceding discussion suggests the opposite. But though these opinions 
may be controversial and subject to interpretation, they are disting–
uishable from the reasonableness-balancing model approach, which 
enables judges to engage in a never-ending, ad hoc balancing analysis 
 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755, 760–61 (1985) (noting, in refusing to 
uphold a court order allowing nonconsensual surgery to remove a bullet from 
a suspect’s chest, that the Fourth Amendment’s “ordinary requirements” of 
a warrant and probable cause are “the threshold” for a “surgical search and 
seizure” and then, “[b]eyond these standards,” a balancing test must be 
applied); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (acknowledging that 
exigent circumstances could justify a warrantless home entry to arrest for a 
“serious” crime, but refusing to allow a warrantless entry to arrest for a 
“minor” non-jailable DUI offense). 
271. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818–19. 
272. In fact, scholars cannot even agree how many different warrant exceptions 
the Court has created. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warr–
ants Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1609, 1620 & n.33 (2012). 
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to determine the constitutionality of a search or seizure depending on 
the facts of a particular case. 
It remains to consider how much of a mark the Court’s three 
balancing model opinions have actually made on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The following Part turns to that question. 
III. The Legacy of the Reasonableness-               
balancing Model 
As noted above, some academics are of the view that the Supreme 
Court has now completely abandoned the warrant-presumption model 
and converted to the reasonableness-balancing approach.273 In order to 
test that proposition, this Part of the Article first examines the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment case law since Maryland v. King and then turns to 
the lower courts’ treatment of the Court’s balancing model trilogy. In 
the end, the Article finds little support for scholars’ fears. 
The Supreme Court has by and large continued following the 
warrant-presumption model, even resisting several opportunities to 
apply a balancing approach. While the lower courts have commonly 
applied the balancing model and ruled in favor of the prosecution in 
cases similar to the three Supreme Court precedents, they have 
generally been hesitant to extend the model to other contexts, and at 
times have explicitly refused to interpret the trilogy expansively. 
Nevertheless, even though the model has not yet managed to make 
substantial inroads in undermining Fourth Amendment protections, 
most of the defendant-friendly lower court opinions generated dissents 
or disagreements with other courts, confirming the criticisms of the 
balancing approach as subjective and malleable. Moreover, the cases 
that found the balancing test favored the defendant were, or could have 
been, resolved under the warrant-presumption model as well. The 
uncertainty surrounding both when a balancing analysis is appropriate 
and how the competing interests should be weighed therefore supports 
continued adherence to the warrant-presumption model and exclusion 
of evidence uncovered during warrantless searches that are not justified 
by a warrant exception. 
A. Subsequent Supreme Court Opinions 
Despite academics’ concerns about the continued viability of the 
warrant-presumption model, the Court has continued to follow that 
model in Fourth Amendment cases decided since the three 
reasonableness-balancing model decisions.274 Although the Court has 
 
273. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
274. See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34 (2019) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 2539–40 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 
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still declined to offer any explanation or justification for its choice of 
model in a particular case, no majority opinion issued in the seven years 
since Maryland v. King has used the balancing approach to evaluate 
the constitutionality of a Fourth Amendment intrusion outside the 
special needs context. 
In fact, the majority in Rodriguez v. United States ignored the three 
dissenters’ plea to “adhere to the reasonableness requirement”275 and 
apply the two-step approach Justice Scalia laid out in Wyoming v. 
Houghton.276 Instead, the Court held that a traffic stop may not be 
extended “‘beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] 
mission’ of issuing a warning ticket,” rejecting the dissent’s balancing-
type argument that the substantial government interest in drug 
interdiction “offset[]” the “de minimis” intrusion occasioned by the 
short delay required to enable a drug detection dog to sniff Rodriguez’s 
vehicle.277 
In addition, while language mirroring the “touchstone” mantra has 
featured in six majority opinions that postdate Maryland v. King, none 
of them applied the reasonableness-balancing model. In the first, 
Fernandez v. California, the Court simply used the “touchstone” phrase 
in the way it was first utilized in Brigham City v. Stuart278—to explain 
the warrant-presumption model. Although a warrant is “generally 
required” to search a home, the Court pointed out in Fernandez, “‘the 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness’” and 
therefore “certain categories of permissible warrantless searches have 
long been recognized.”279 
The Court repeated that sentiment in Riley v. California280 but then 
went on to rely on Houghton in noting that, “[a]bsent more precise 
guidance from the founding era,” the Justices “generally” decide 
 
2543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 
419 (2015); Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014). For additional 
cases, see supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
275. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 361 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
276. See id. at 359. For discussion of Houghton’s approach, see supra notes 130–
138 and accompanying text. 
277. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350–51, 356 (first alteration in original) (quoting 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). 
278. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); see also supra notes 206–
208 and accompanying text.  
279. Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403) (discussing the consent search exception). 
280. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014). 
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whether a warrant is required by using a balancing analysis.281 Although 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion discussed the competing 
governmental and individual privacy interests in deciding that police 
may not search the data on a cell phone as part of a search incident to 
arrest,282 this case fits more closely in the warrant-presumption model 
camp. Mirroring the balancing test used in Terry to justify creating the 
stop-and-frisk exception to the warrant requirement,283 Riley observed 
that the “balancing of interests supported the search incident to arrest 
exception,” and the Court’s discussion of the government’s side of the 
balance focused on the specific “rationales” underlying that warrant 
exception: protecting officers and preserving evidence.284 Aside from the 
reference to Houghton, therefore, Riley reads like a standard warrant-
presumption model opinion analyzing the permissible scope of what the 
Court called the “categorical rule” allowing warrantless searches 
incident to arrest.285 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, which held that law enforcement 
officials may administer breathalyzer but not blood tests incident to the 
arrest of a DUI suspect, relied on Riley, but was even clearer in 
endorsing the warrant-presumption model.286 Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion in Birchfield did note that the language of the Fourth 
Amendment makes reasonableness “the ultimate measure” of the 
validity of a search, but the Court was explaining the warrant-presum–
ption model there.287 
The opinion went on to discuss the “individual privacy interests” 
burdened by breath and blood tests,288 and to compare blood alcohol 
tests to the DNA testing approved in Maryland v. King.289 But, like  
281. Id. at 385 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
282. See id. at 385–98. 
283. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10–15 (1968); see also supra notes 97–100 and 
accompanying text. 
284. Riley, 573 U.S. at 386. 
285. Id.; cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (refusing to allow a 
search incident to arrest to extend beyond “the area ‘within [the arrestee’s] 
immediate control’”). 
286. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184, 2176, 2173 (2016). 
287. Id. at 2173 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 
(1995)) (acknowledging the “usual requirement” of a warrant, “subject to a 
number of exceptions”). 
288. Id. at 2176. 
289. See id. at 2177 (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446, 461–65 (2013)). 
Interestingly, the Court noted that King “contrast[ed] sharply” with 
Birchfield because breathalyzers “reveal[] only one bit of information” and 
leave nothing “in the possession of the police,” whereas DNA cheek swabs 
give the government “possession of . . . a sample from which a wealth of 
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Riley, Birchfield reads like a straightforward warrant-presumption 
model decision assessing the scope of searches incident to arrest. In fact, 
the Court decided the case on a search-incident-to-arrest rationale even 
though the court below had applied the reasonableness-balancing 
model.290 Moreover, Justice Alito chided the dissenters for misciting 
Supreme Court precedent that called for using a balancing approach in 
deciding “‘whether the public interest demands creation’” of a new 
categorical warrant exception and “not” in “apply[ing] an existing 
exception.”291 Riley, the Birchfield Court emphasized, mandated a 
balancing analysis when evaluating the reasonableness of a “category” 
of warrantless searches—searches incident to arrest—whereas the 
“applicability” of the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not 
“turn[] on case-specific variables.”292 Thus, Birchfield, like Riley, 
followed in the footsteps of Terry and approved of using a balancing 
test within the confines of the warrant-presumption model in creating 
and determining the reach of the categorical warrant exceptions.293 
The final three post-King opinions to repeat the “touchstone” 
mantra likewise did so within the framework of the warrant-
presumption model. As in some of its earlier decisions,294 the majority 
in Heien v. North Carolina used the “touchstone” language to support 
the notion that reasonableness “allows for some mistakes on the part of 
 
additional, highly personal information could potentially be obtained.” Id. 
Although Justice Alito added the qualification that King’s DNA sample 
“could lawfully be used only for identification purposes” under the Maryland 
statute at issue there, id., Birchfield’s description of the intrusiveness of DNA 
testing seems at odds with the King Court’s reasoning. See supra note 87 
and accompanying text.  
290. See State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302, 309–10 (N.D. 2015), rev’d, 136 
S. Ct. 2160 (2016); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 31–36, Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (No. 
14–1468), 2016 WL 4177088, at *31–36 (relying on Maryland v. King’s 
balancing approach). The state supreme court’s opinion in Birchfield is 
discussed infra note 478. 
291. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2180 (emphasis in original) (quoting Camara v. 
Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)). 
292. Id. at 2185 n.8, 2180 (emphasis added). 
293. Similarly, in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34 (2019) (plurality 
opinion), the Justices—without mentioning the reasonableness model or 
balancing tests—used the warrant-presumption model in analyzing whether 
warrantless blood testing of unconscious drivers in DUI cases falls within the 
exigent circumstances exception. See also id. at 2539–40 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
294. See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text. 
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governmental officials.”295 County of Los Angeles v. Mendez quoted the 
“touchstone” phrase in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
long used by the Court in evaluating excessive force claims.296 And 
Kansas v. Glover cited the phrase in concluding that reasonable 
suspicion justified the traffic stop in that case.297 
The only recent Supreme Court opinion that arguably endorsed the 
reasonableness-balancing model is the unanimous per curiam opinion in 
Grady v. North Carolina, which held that requiring a recidivist sex 
offender to wear a tracking device constituted a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.298 Although the Court remanded the case to the 
state courts to assess the constitutionality of the search, it noted that 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.”299 
Grady then went on to observe that the reasonableness of a search turns 
on all of the circumstances, “including the nature and purpose of the 
search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable 
privacy expectations.”300 Although, as discussed above, a totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis does not necessarily trigger a balancing 
test301 and reading too much into dictum in a per curiam opinion seems 
risky, the Court cited both Samson and the special needs ruling in 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton following that statement.302 
With the exception of Grady’s dictum and Riley’s reference to 
Houghton, the Supreme Court cases decided since the trilogy of 
reasonableness-balancing model opinions have adhered to the warrant-
presumption approach, thus suggesting that that model is still alive and 
well. The Court even declined the opportunity to use the balancing 
model in Rodriguez and Birchfield, and the Birchfield majority 
emphasized the appropriateness of using a balancing test in deciding 
 
295. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014) (holding that reasonable 
suspicion can exist despite a police officer’s reasonable mistake of law). For 
criticism of the ruling in Heien, see Kit Kinports, Heien’s Mistake of Law, 
68 Ala. L. Rev. 121 (2016). 
296. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017). For dis–
cussion of the Court’s excessive force jurisprudence, see supra notes 111–114 
and accompanying text. 
297. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2020). 
298. Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 307, 309–10 (2015) (per curiam). 
299. Id. at 310 (emphasis in original). 
300. Id. 
301. See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
302. See Grady, 575 U.S. at 310 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 
(2006); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)). For lower 
court opinions applying Grady, see infra notes 371–395 and accompanying 
text. 
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whether to create a warrant exception but not in applying that 
exception to the facts of a given case (at least in the context of searches 
incident to arrest). The Section that follows continues to explore the 
legacy of the reasonableness-balancing model by analyzing the lower 
court case law applying the Supreme Court’s trilogy. 
B. Subsequent Lower Court Opinions 
A survey of the lower courts’ reaction to Knights, Samson, and 
King303 reveals that the clear majority of citations to the Supreme 
Court’s reasonableness-balancing model trilogy are unremarkable. A 
substantial number of federal court of appeals opinions simply 
referenced the Court’s three decisions in introducing the warrant-
presumption model,304 much as the Court itself has done on several 
occasions,305 or in applying the warrant-presumption model.306 Not 
surprisingly, other federal appellate court opinions relied on the 
Supreme Court precedents in allowing searches of probationers and 
parolees.307 And while a few federal courts used the special needs rubric 
 
303. In evaluating the impact that the reasonableness-balancing model has had 
on the lower courts, I Shepardized Knights, Samson, and King, looking at 
opinions issued by the federal courts of appeals and the state supreme courts 
through June 30, 2020. 
304. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 917 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2019); United 
States v. Sanders, 712 F. App’x 956, 958 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); 
United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44, 50–51 (3d Cir. 2014); United States 
v. Barner, 666 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Lemus, 582 
F.3d 958, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). 
305. See supra notes 206–208, 278–279 and accompanying text. 
306. See, e.g., United States v. Richmond, 915 F.3d 352, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(automobile exception); United States v. Lyles, 910 F.3d 787, 796 (4th Cir. 
2018) (overly broad warrant); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 
487–88 (6th Cir. 2015) (private search doctrine); United States v. Bailey, 
743 F.3d 322, 331–32 (2d Cir. 2014) (stop and frisk); United States v. 
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960–68 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (administrative 
search); Bernini v. City of Saint Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(probable cause); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 
F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (administrative search); United States v. 
Schlatter, 411 F. App’x 896, 898–99 (7th Cir. 2011) (stop and frisk); Mollo 
v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’n, 406 F. App’x 664, 668–69 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(administrative search); United States v. Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024, 
1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (consent and exigent circumstances); United States v. 
Jimenez, 419 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (protective sweep); United States 
v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasonable sus–
picion), overruled on other grounds by Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 
61 (2014). 
307. See, e.g., United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 402–03 (2d Cir. 2018); 
United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1273–76 (9th Cir. 2017); United 
States v. Jackson, 866 F.3d 982, 984–85 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
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to analyze the permissibility of DNA collection,308 most of them 
anticipated Maryland v. King’s reliance on the balancing model in 
upholding DNA testing.309 
The pattern in the state supreme courts is similar, with some courts 
citing the reasonableness-balancing model precedents in introducing310 
or applying311 the warrant-presumption model, in permitting searches 
of probationers and parolees,312 and in allowing DNA testing prior to 
 
Doxey, 833 F.3d 692, 703–06 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. White, 781 
F.3d 858, 861–64 (7th Cir. 2015). For federal cases with similar facts 
balancing in favor of the defendant, see infra notes 347, 352–357 and accom–
panying text. 
308. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 402–03 n.15 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (citing United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); Green v. Berge, 
354 F.3d 675, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
309. See, e.g., id. at 402–03; United States v. Stewart, 532 F.3d 32, 34–36 (1st 
Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 424–27 (6th Cir. 2008); Banks 
v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 923–25 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 830–32 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). For federal cases using the 
balancing test to invalidate DNA testing, see infra notes 362–369 and 
accompanying text.  
310. See, e.g., People v. Brunsting, 307 P.3d 1073, 1078–79 (Colo. 2013); Shotts 
v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. 2010); State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 
224, 228 (Minn. 2016); State v. Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Mo. 2011); 
State v. Gathers, 190 A.3d 409, 415 (N.J. 2018); People v. Molnar, 774 
N.E.2d 738, 739–40 (N.Y. 2002); Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 
1084 (Pa. 2017). 
311. See, e.g., In re Raymond C., 196 P.3d 810, 813 (Cal. 2008) (stop and frisk); 
State v. Mann, 857 A.2d 329, 339 (Conn. 2004) (frisk); State v. Doe, 233 
P.3d 1275, 1280 (Idaho 2010) (administrative search); People v. Oliver, 925 
N.E.2d 1107, 1112–13 (Ill. 2010) (stop); State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 
293–94 (Iowa 2013) (probable cause); State v. Watts, 126 A.3d 1216, 1223 
(N.J. 2015) (detention during execution of search warrant); State v. 
Hathaway 120 A.3d 155, 168 (N.J. 2015) (emergency aid search); People v. 
Garvin, 88 N.E.3d 319, 328–29 (N.Y. 2017) (consent); State v. Hi Ti Lar, 
908 N.W.2d 181, 185–86 (S.D. 2018) (search incident to arrest); Montague 
v. Commonwealth, 684 S.E.2d 583, 587–88 (Va. 2009) (seizure); Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (Va. 2008) (reasonable suspicion). 
312. See, e.g., State v. Adair, 383 P.3d 1132, 1135–36 (Ariz. 2016); People v. 
Schmitz, 288 P.3d 1259, 1268–69 (Cal. 2012); People v. Wilson, 885 N.E.2d 
1033, 1037 (Ill. 2008); State v. Toliver, 417 P.3d 253, 256 (Kan. 2018); State 
v. Stenhoff, 925 N.W.2d 429, 432–34 (N.D. 2019); State v. Kottman, 707 
N.W.2d 114, 118–21 (S.D. 2005); State v. Hamm, 589 S.W.3d 765, 773–77 
(Tenn. 2019); State ex rel. A.C.C., 44 P.3d 708, 711–14 (Utah 2002); State 
v. Kane, 169 A.3d 762, 772–74 (Vt. 2017); State v. Purtell, 851 N.W.2d 417, 
424–26 (Wis. 2014). For state cases balancing in favor of probationers and 
parolees, see infra notes 345–347, 349–351 and accompanying text. 
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Maryland v. King.313 Again, however, other state courts used the special 
needs framework to analyze the constitutionality of DNA collection.314 
Aside from these decisions, the record in the lower courts is mixed. 
Some courts have been reserved in applying the three Supreme Court 
opinions, refusing to engage in a balancing analysis, requiring the 
prosecution to satisfy both models, or weighing the competing interests 
in favor of the defendant. On the other hand, there are a few discrete 
areas in which the lower courts have arguably used the Supreme Court 
precedent more aggressively, expanding the contexts in which the 
balancing model surfaces. Even here, however, the cases are few in 
number and not always transparent in their rationale, and, with the 
exception of those involving foreign intelligence and national security 
searches, it is not obvious how much they have departed from the 
warrant-presumption model and extended the reach of the balancing 
model. The rest of this Section explores each of these topics in turn, 
concluding with an assessment of why the Court created the balancing 
model and what its future holds, and suggesting that, although the 
Supreme Court’s trilogy has not had much of an impact on Fourth 
Amendment case law, the amorphousness and pliability of the balancing 
approach suggest that courts should continue to follow the warrant-
presumption model and suppress evidence discovered during 
warrantless searches that do not fall within a categorical warrant 
exception. 
1. Refusing to Balance 
Several state supreme courts, interpreting their own state 
constitutions, have refused to follow the Supreme Court’s 
reasonableness-balancing model precedents. In State v. Short, a major–
ity of the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted the state constitution to 
reject the approach taken in Knights and Samson and instead to require 
law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before searching the home 
of a probationer or parolee.315 The court was critical of the 
 
313. See, e.g., Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 480–82 (Ariz. 2012); People v. 
Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 65 (Cal. 2010); People v. Lakisha M. (In re Lakisha 
M.), 882 N.E.2d 570, 573–81 (Ill. 2008); State v. Hutchinson, 969 A.2d 923, 
930–31 (Me. 2009); State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 27 (Md. 2004); In re 
M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 2012); State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 
2–3 (Minn. 2012); State v. Sanders, 163 P.3d 607, 611–12 (Or. 2007); 
Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 97–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). For state 
cases using the balancing test to invalidate DNA testing, see infra note 370 
and accompanying text.  
314. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 830 (citing five state court decisions). 
315. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 506 (Iowa 2014). But see id. at 507 
(Waterman, J., dissenting) (advocating that the court follow Knights); id. at 
520 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (same). 
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reasonableness-balancing model, describing it as a “newly fashioned . . . 
doctrine” that relies on “slippery reasoning” and enables the Justices to 
circumvent the warrant requirement “whenever a majority . . . 
determines that it is ‘reasonable’ to do so.”316 Pointing out that judges 
“can come up with ingenious explanations of how just about any search 
is reasonable,” the Iowa court had “little interest” in permitting the 
reasonableness clause of the state constitution to act as “a generalized 
trump card” to “override the warrant clause” in cases involving home 
searches.317 
The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the reasonableness-balancing 
model outright in State v. Yong Shik Won, reasoning that the state 
constitution does not countenance “an indeterminate balancing test” 
but instead requires a warrant or a warrant exception “rooted in our 
law.”318 The court therefore concluded that the lower court had erred 
in relying on Maryland v. King and characterizing reasonableness as 
“the ultimate measure of the constitutionality” of a search.319 
In State v. Kane, the Vermont Supreme Court similarly indicated 
that it had declined to adopt “the federal balancing test” under its state 
constitution and therefore required proof of a “‘special need’” to 
“justif[y] departing from the warrant and probable cause require–
ment.”320 Consistent with that view, the Vermont court’s opinion in 
State v. Medina was critical of the approach taken in Maryland v. King 
and instead used the special needs rubric in striking down a state 
 
316. Id. at 497, 502 (majority opinion). 
317. Id. at 501–02; see also State v. Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794, 804 (Iowa 2018) 
(noting, in rejecting the Supreme Court’s approach to automobile inventory 
searches, that the reasonableness-balancing model is a “revisionist trend” 
that relies on a “new innovative touchstone” to create “a free-floating and 
open-ended concept of ‘reasonableness’ . . . unhinged from the warrant 
requirement”); cf. State v. King, 867 N.W.2d 106, 115 n.5 (Iowa 2015) 
(applying the special needs exception rather than the balancing model in 
evaluating the permissibility under the state constitution of a parole officer’s 
search of a parolee’s home). 
318. State v. Yong Shik Won, 372 P.3d 1065, 1085 (Haw. 2015). 
319. Id. (quoting State v. Yong Shik Won, 332 P.3d 661, 679 (Haw. Ct. App. 
2014), rev’d, 372 P.3d 1065 (Haw. 2015)). The state supreme court also 
rejected the argument that the consent search exception allowed police to 
administer a breathalyzer test to a DUI arrestee who was told that refusing 
the test would lead to criminal charges. See id. at 1081–84. 
320. State v. Kane, 169 A.3d 762, 775 (Vt. 2017) (internal quotation marks 
omitted in original) (quoting State v. Bogert, 109 A.3d 883, 889 (Vt. 2014)) 
(upholding a probation condition requiring electronic monitoring). 
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statute that authorized DNA testing of any felony suspect following a 
judicial determination of probable cause.321 
Other state court opinions have refused to apply the reason–
ableness-balancing model in interpreting the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment. In State v. Ryce, the Kansas Supreme Court declined to 
play “the wild card of general reasonableness” in a case contesting the 
constitutionality of a statute that criminalized a DUI arrestee’s refusal 
to consent to a BAC test.322 Noting that the Supreme Court has “often 
repeated” the language endorsing the warrant-presumption model, the 
Kansas court quoted Illinois v. McArthur in explaining that “general 
reasonableness applies in limited circumstances, such as ‘[w]hen faced 
with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, 
minimal intrusions, or the like.’”323 Finding no special need, reduced 
expectation of privacy, or de minimis intrusion in that case, the court 
concluded (without acknowledging Maryland v. King here) that 
“[g]eneral reasonableness—untethered from the special needs 
exception—is not a recognized warrant exception in a criminal 
context.”324 
In a similar case, State v. Villarreal, a divided Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals declined to apply the reasonableness-balancing test 
in assessing the constitutionality of a state statute permitting 
warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws following certain DWI 
arrests.325 After rejecting the prosecution’s reliance on several warrant 
 
321. State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 668, 674–79 (Vt. 2014); see also State v. 
O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 277 (N.J. 2007) (using the special needs framework 
rather than a balancing test to assess the permissibility of DNA testing in 
a pre-King case, noting that “[t]he more stringent special needs analysis 
provides an appropriate framework for evaluating defendant’s . . . state 
constitutional claims”). 
322. State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 375 (Kan. 2016) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting State v. Baughman, 32 P.3d 199, 201 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2001)). For further discussion of the constitutionality of implied consent 
statutes, see infra notes 478–480 and accompanying text.  
323. Ryce, 368 P.3d at 375 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 
531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)). For further discussion of McArthur’s language, 
see supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text. 
324. Ryce, 368 P.3d at 375. The court also rejected the argument that the BAC 
test could be justified as a consensual, see id. at 363–64, 369, or special 
needs search, see id. at 366–67. 
325. State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 794, 808–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) 
(evaluating a statute that allowed blood tests where arrests involved 
aggravating circumstances, such as fatal accidents or drivers with at least 
two prior DWI convictions). But see id. at 815–16 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) 
(applying the Supreme Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances balancing 
test). 
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exceptions,326 the majority dismissed the State’s “alternative” argument 
based on Maryland v. King that “a balancing test is appropriate given 
the context.”327 Rather, the court admonished, “[t]he Supreme Court 
has made clear” that an “established [warrant] exception” is required 
when law enforcement’s “primary goal” is “gathering . . . evidence” in 
“an active criminal investigation,” and the court refused to ignore “this 
well-established principle in favor of a more generalized balancing-of-
interests test.”328 Unlike the Kansas Supreme Court in Ryce, the Texas 
court addressed Maryland v. King, but found that case distinguishable, 
ultimately declining to give King a “broad reading” that would allow 
judges to perform a balancing test in evaluating the permissibility of 
“an investigative search.”329 
In addition to these state court opinions, a plurality of the en banc 
D.C. Circuit expressly refused to use the reasonableness-balancing 
model in United States v. Askew, rejecting the Government’s argument 
that unzipping the defendant’s jacket to enable a robbery victim to 
better see the rest of his clothing was “a reasonable, de minimis 
investigative measure that appropriately facilitated the show-up 
procedure.”330 The Supreme Court had already balanced the relevant 
interests in the stop-and-frisk line of cases, the plurality responded, and 
no precedent allowed the police to continue searching a suspect based 
only on reasonable suspicion when a frisk had not uncovered a 
weapon.331 Therefore, the plurality concluded, lower courts were “not 
free to reweigh the interests at issue” to create “a wholly new 
investigative identification search exception to the warrant . . . 
 
326. See id. at 798 (majority opinion) (rejecting the exceptions for consent 
searches, automobile searches, special needs searches, and searches incident 
to arrest). 
327. Id. at 808. 
328. Id. at 808–09. 
329. Id. at 810; see also id. at 809–10 (distinguishing King as involving a “routine 
administrative procedure[]” that afforded “no discretion” to law enforce–
ment officials and created only a “minimal . . . intrusion beyond what a 
DWI arrestee would otherwise experience”). For contrary DUI cases, see 
infra note 478 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Villarreal, 
see infra note 479. 
330. United States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(plurality opinion) (quoting the Government’s en banc brief). Another part 
of this opinion, which was joined by a majority of the judges, concluded 
that the search could not be justified under Terry because it was not part 
of the frisk and was not supported by reasonable suspicion. See id. at 1140–
44 (majority opinion). 
331. See id. at 1127 (plurality opinion). 
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requirement[].”332 Askew arose before Maryland v. King, but the 
plurality distinguished Knights as a case involving an individual who 
had a reduced “expectation of privacy as a result of governmental 
supervision.”333 
These cases are relatively few in number, and all of them generated 
disagreement among the judges themselves or with other courts. 
Nevertheless, they are illustrations of courts unwilling to discard the 
warrant-presumption model and engage in a balancing analysis, at 
times even in contexts similar to the Court’s trilogy of balancing model 
opinions. 
2. Requiring Compliance with Both Models 
Interestingly, a handful of lower courts have interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s reasonableness-balancing model opinions to suggest 
that the Fourth Amendment requires the prosecution to satisfy both 
the warrant-presumption model and the reasonableness-balancing 
model. In two cases involving invasive strip searches of arrestees,334 for 
example, the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Court of Appeals adopted that 
view, relying on the Supreme Court’s statement in Maryland v. King 
that, “[e]ven if a warrant is not required, a search is not beyond Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny[,] for it must be reasonable in its scope and 
manner of execution.”335 Although the Justices made this observation 
in the context of announcing that they were going to apply the 
reasonableness-balancing model rather than the warrant-presumption 
model to resolve the question before them in King,336 the two lower 
courts used the statement to justify skipping over the question whether 
a warrant exception applied and invalidating the strip searches under 
the balancing test.337 In the words of the Ninth Circuit, “we need not 
and do not determine” if a warrant was necessary to strip search the 
arrestee because the officers’ actions were “unreasonable for other 
 
332. Id. at 1127, 1134. 
333. Id. at 1135. 
334. See United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2015) (police officer 
“forcibly ‘retrieved’” a plastic bag from the defendant’s rectum “without the 
assistance of anesthesia, lubricant, or medical dilation”); Akinmboni v. 
United States, 126 A.3d 694, 696–97 (D.C. 2015) (deputy marshal ordered 
the defendant to remove several plastic baggies “from [his] anal cavity” 
without “seek[ing] the assistance of trained medical personnel”). 
335. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d at 962 (first alteration in original) (quoting Maryland 
v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013)); see also Akinmboni, 126 A.3d at 697–
98 (quoting the same language from King). 
336. See King, 569 U.S. at 448; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
337. See Fowlkes, 804 F.3d at 962; Akinmboni, 126 A.3d at 697–98. 
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reasons.”338 The D.C. court similarly reasoned that it “need not address” 
the prosecution’s reliance on the plain view and search-incident-to-
arrest exceptions given the court’s conclusion that it was unreasonable 
to perform the search without the assistance of trained medical 
personnel.339 
In Palacios v. Burge, a case predating Maryland v. King, the Second 
Circuit adopted a similar approach in reliance on Samson.340 After 
determining that exigency justified a warrantless show-up outside a 
club where two people had just been stabbed, the court went on to 
quote Samson and caution that “[f]inding exigent circumstances . . . 
does not alone” conclude the constitutional inquiry because “[w]e must 
still examine” if the show-up was “reasonable, which remains the 
‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.’”341 Although the Second 
Circuit ultimately weighed the competing interests in favor of the 
Government,342 the view that the prosecution must satisfy the 
reasonableness-balancing model as well as the warrant-presumption 
model is certainly a defendant-friendly interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s balancing model opinions.343  
3. Balancing in Favor of the Defendant 
Even when the lower courts rely solely on the reasonableness-
balancing model, their use of that approach does not, unlike in the 
Supreme Court, invariably signal a victory for the prosecution. In cases 
that have arisen in circumstances similar to the Supreme Court’s 
trilogy, the lower courts have generally weighed the competing interests 
in favor of the government.344 Nevertheless, even here there are 
exceptions. And some lower court opinions, while extending the 
balancing approach to other contexts, have ultimately ruled for the 
defendant. This Section first discusses the cases factually similar to the 
Supreme Court’s precedents and then turns to those that have 
expanded the balancing model to other types of law enforcement 
intrusions. 
 
338. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d at 962. But see id. at 976 (Restani, J., dissenting in 
part) (arguing that the search was reasonable under the totality-of-the-
circumstances balancing test). 
339. Akinmboni, 126 A.3d at 697. 
340. Palacios v. Burge, 589 F.3d 556, 563 (2d Cir. 2009). 
341. Id. (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006)). 
342. See id. at 565–66. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 457–
466 and accompanying text. 
343. For other lower court opinions arguably following this approach, see infra 
notes 430, 467–477 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 307–309, 312–314 and accompanying text. 
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a. Searches of Parolees and Probationers  
In Jones v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court distinguished Knights 
and refused to allow the warrantless search of a probationer’s home 
absent some “law, legally authorized regulation, or sentencing order” 
that gave him “notice” he had a reduced expectation of privacy.345 
Reasoning that “notice is a critical consideration” in measuring 
reasonable expectations of privacy, the court concluded that the 
defendant’s “status as a probationer, standing alone, cannot serve as a 
substitute for a search warrant.”346 Although some courts have agreed 
with the Georgia Supreme Court,347 others have refused to read Knights 
and Samson as requiring an explicit search condition.348 
In Commonwealth v. Moore, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court applied a balancing test in holding under its own state 
constitution that searches of parolees’ homes require reasonable 
suspicion.349 Although the court found that the State’s “supervisory 
 
345. Jones v. State, 653 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ga. 2007). 
346. Id. at 459. 
347. See, e.g., United States v. Henley, 941 F.3d 646, 650–51 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(requiring notice to justify a suspicionless search of a parolee’s home); United 
States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015) (describing the search 
condition as “critical” to the outcome in Knights and Samson, and therefore 
requiring probable cause to search a probationer’s home in the absence of a 
search condition); United States v. Freeman, 479 F.3d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 
2007) (striking down the search of a parolee’s home on the grounds that it 
“exceeded [his] reasonable expectations” because the search condition he 
signed covered only searches by parole officers and state regulations required 
them to have reasonable suspicion to search); State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 
775, 777–78 (Ind. 2015) (rejecting the argument that Samson “authorize[d] 
suspicionless searches based on a parolee’s status alone,” and distinguishing 
Knights because the search condition required probable cause to search 
Vanderkolk’s home); cf. State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 365 (Kan. 2016) 
(distinguishing Samson on the grounds that drivers do not have a reduced 
expectation of privacy and “do not necessarily have express notice” that 
driving constitutes implied consent to DUI testing, in the context of rejecting 
the argument that such tests fall within the consent search exception). 
348. See, e.g., United States v. Caya, 956 F.3d 498, 503 (7th Cir. 2020) 
(upholding a state statute authorizing searches of offenders on supervised 
release based on reasonable suspicion, and noting that neither Knights nor 
Samson “rested on a consent rationale, either express or implied”); United 
States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (maintaining that the 
“core reasoning” of Knights was to “explain[] why the needs of the probation 
system outweigh the privacy rights of the probationers generally,” and 
finding a diminished expectation of privacy there—despite the absence of a 
search condition—because courts in that state had “consistently” allowed 
searches of probationers’ homes supported by only reasonable suspicion). 
349. Commonwealth v. Moore, 43 N.E.3d 294, 300 (Mass. 2016). 
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interests” outweighed a parolee’s reduced expectation of privacy, the 
court disagreed with Samson and concluded that a reasonable suspicion 
requirement constituted “an important safeguard against unfettered 
police authority.”350 Moreover, the court held that the parole board 
could not circumvent its ruling by imposing a search condition on a 
particular parolee that authorized suspicionless searches.351 
In United States v. Scott, a case that arose in the analogous context 
of pretrial release, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit determined that 
a random drug testing condition did not survive the balancing test and 
therefore required probable cause.352 After rejecting the Government’s 
arguments that the search condition could be justified as either a 
consent search or a special needs search,353 the court applied “a more 
general ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach.”354 The case predated 
Maryland v. King, and the majority distinguished Knights on the 
grounds that the defendant had “merely” been “accused of a crime” and 
was “still presumed innocent.”355 The Ninth Circuit also rejected “the 
assumption” that pretrial releasees were more likely to commit 
additional crimes compared to the general public “without an 
individualized determination to that effect.”356 Finally, the court 
reasoned that the Government had no interest in “integrating” an 
arrestee, “who ha[d] never left the community, back into the 
community,” and therefore the law enforcement interests in “surveill–
ance and control” were “considerably less” for pretrial releasees than 
for probationers.357 
In a similar case decided after Maryland v. King, however, the 
Montana Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion. In that case, 
State v. Spady, the Montana court applied the reasonableness-balancing 
model in upholding a state statute that authorized judges to require 
twice-a-day breathalyzer tests as a condition of pretrial release for those 
arrested for second or subsequent DUI offenses.358 Relying on King, the 
court applied what it called “the diminished expectation of privacy 
 
350. Id. at 300, 304. 
351. See id. at 300 n.6. 
352. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006). But see id. at 889 
(Bybee, J., dissenting) (arguing that the balancing test required only re–
asonable suspicion). 
353. See id. at 865–72 (majority opinion). 
354. Id. at 872. 
355. Id. at 873. 
356. Id. at 874. 
357. Id. 
358. State v. Spady, 354 P.3d 590, 598 (Mont. 2015). 
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exception” in concluding that the State’s “compelling” interests 
outbalanced the intrusion on the defendant’s privacy.359 The court 
reasoned that the Government had “an important interest” in ensuring 
that “repeat DUI arrestees” do not drive under the influence, and 
testing them twice a day had “a strong capacity to deter” drunk 
driving.360 On the other side of the equation, the court characterized the 
privacy interests as “minimal” because defendants on pretrial release 
have a reduced expectation of privacy, the tests “involve little 
embarrassment or discomfort,” and they reveal no “sensitive medical 
information.”361 
Although the decision to rely on the reasonableness-balancing 
model in cases involving pretrial release is arguably an extension of the 
Supreme Court’s trilogy, it seems a natural outgrowth from the 
reasoning in Knights and Samson that conditions of release trigger a 
reduced expectation of privacy coupled with King’s argument that 
arrestees enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy. Notably, however, 
each of the lower court decisions discussed in this Section that favored 
the defendant encountered resistance from other judges on the panel or 
from other courts.  
b. DNA Testing  
In several cases that predated Maryland v. King, lower courts 
applied the balancing model and struck down law enforcement’s 
collection of a suspect’s DNA. In United States v. Davis, the Fourth 
Circuit used a balancing analysis to conclude that police violated the 
Fourth Amendment when they linked a suspect to a murder scene by 
collecting DNA from clothes that had been taken from him four years 
earlier in investigating a crime allegedly committed against him.362 On 
the defendant’s side of the balance, the court acknowledged that his 
“privacy interest in . . . bodily integrity” was not affected by the 
method of DNA collection used in that case and his expectation of 
privacy was reduced because he was aware the police had his clothes 




361. Id.; cf. Castillo v. United States, 816 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(applying the reasonableness-balancing model in upholding the search of the 
home of a defendant who had entered into a pretrial deferred prosecution 
agreement). For other cases analyzing conditions of pretrial release under 
the balancing model, see infra notes 382–386, 392–394 and accompanying 
text. 
362. United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 231–32, 250 (4th Cir. 2012). 
363. Id. at 249. 
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reasoned that the DNA testing took place while the defendant was “a 
free citizen who retained a reasonable privacy interest in his DNA 
sample and DNA profile.”364 Although the court conceded the State had 
“a strong and important interest” in prosecuting murder cases and “a 
legitimate interest” in entering additional profiles into the DNA 
database “to improve its efficacy as a crime-solving tool,” the court also 
noted that, unlike DNA testing involving no police discretion, here the 
officers collected the defendant’s DNA because he was suspected of 
being involved in a murder based on a standard of proof lower than 
probable cause.365 
In Friedman v. Boucher, a DNA case more similar to Maryland v. 
King, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit determined that forcibly 
collecting a pretrial detainee’s DNA “as an aid to solve cold cases” failed 
the reasonableness-balancing test.366 After rejecting a special needs 
rationale on the grounds that DNA testing involved ordinary criminal 
law enforcement,367 the court turned to the argument that “the search 
was ‘reasonable.’”368 Noting that the detainee was not suspected of 
being involved in any unsolved crime, the majority distinguished 
Samson on the grounds that Friedman had “successfully” “completed 
his term of supervised release” on a previous offense and “was no longer 
[under] the supervision of any authority.”369 
And, in King itself, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded by a 
vote of five to two that the balancing process favored the defendant, 
reasoning that individuals who were under arrest but not yet convicted 
“generally” had “a sufficiently weighty and reasonable expectation of 
privacy against warrantless, suspicionless” DNA collection that was not 
outbalanced by the State’s “purported interest” in identifying them in 
connection with the charges for which they had been arrested.370 
 
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 249–50. 
366. Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). But see id. at 862–
65 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the balancing test did not 
favor the detainee). 
367. See id. at 853 (majority opinion). 
368. Id. at 856. 
369. Id. at 858. 
370. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 552 (Md. 2012), rev’d, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). But 
see id. at 581–87 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (concluding that the State should 
prevail under the balancing test). For other DNA cases in which a balancing 
analysis has favored defendants, see State v. McKinney, 730 N.W.2d 74, 85–
86 (Neb. 2007) (holding that police needed probable cause to collect DNA 
from a defendant who had been convicted only of a misdemeanor, when the 
purpose of the testing was not for “databasing,” but “solely for . . . 
investigati[ng] . . . a particular crime”), and State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 
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Although these cases have now been overshadowed by the Supreme 
Court’s reversal of the Maryland court’s decision, and, even before the 
Supreme Court stepped in, were outnumbered by other courts’ opinions 
that warrantless DNA testing survived a balancing analysis, they are 
examples of lower courts weighing the competing interests in a more 
defendant-friendly manner than the Supreme Court. 
c. Electronic Monitoring  
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Grady v. North 
Carolina, lower courts have perhaps unsurprisingly applied the 
reasonableness-balancing model in cases involving electronic monitoring 
of criminal defendants.371 Although this is an area of conflict among the 
courts, a number of them have balanced the competing interests in 
favor of the defendant. 
In Park v. State, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court struck 
down as facially unconstitutional a state statute requiring persons 
designated sexually dangerous predators to wear a GPS monitoring 
device for the rest of their lives, at least “to the extent” that the statute 
allowed searching those who were “no longer serving any part of their 
sentences in order to find evidence of possible criminal conduct.”372 In 
addition to dismissing the State’s special needs argument,373 the court 
considered whether the monitoring was reasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes because “the individuals being searched [had] a 
diminished expectation of privacy.”374 The court thought that Samson’s 
reduced expectation of privacy rationale had “no application” to 
 
678–83 (Vt. 2014) (concluding that a state statute allowing DNA testing of 
any felony suspect following a judicial determination of probable cause 
failed the balancing test required by the state constitution’s special needs 
analysis). Cf. Petitioner F v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 89, 82–83 (Ky. 2010) 
(interpreting Samson as limited to “certain cases” involving the reduced 
expectation of privacy that accompanies a conviction, and therefore using 
the special needs rubric to evaluate DNA testing of juveniles who were 
adjudicated public offenders for certain crimes). 
371. Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306 (2015) (per curiam); see State v. 
Grady, 817 S.E.2d 18, 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that the Supreme 
Court “direct[ed] us to consider two approaches” in evaluating the electronic 
monitoring on remand), modified and aff’d, 831 S.E.2d 542, 555–57, 568 
(N.C. 2019) (applying both the special needs doctrine and the balancing 
model); see also Park v. State, 825 S.E.2d 147, 153 (Ga. 2019) (agreeing 
that, “[p]ursuant to” Grady, “two relevant issues . . . must be addressed”). 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Grady is discussed supra notes 298–302 
and accompanying text. 
372. Park, 825 S.E.2d at 158. 
373. See id. at 154–56. 
374. Id. at 153. 
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defendants who had finished serving “their entire sentences” and were 
no longer on parole or probation.375 The Georgia court was also unim–
pressed with the State’s reliance on the “civil regulatory” restrictions 
imposed on sexually dangerous predators, reasoning that requiring them 
to avoid certain locations and disclose information like their address 
had “nothing to do with . . . constantly tracking [their] movements in 
order to look for evidence of a crime.”376 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court went further in 
Commonwealth v. Feliz and applied the balancing test in striking down 
as “overinclusive” a state statute instructing judges to order GPS 
monitoring as a condition of probation for defendants convicted of most 
sex offenses.377 Probation conditions requiring GPS monitoring must be 
based on “individualized determinations of reasonableness,” the court 
held, and therefore “[m]andatory, blanket imposition of GPS 
monitoring” could not be imposed on every sex offender on probation.378 
Although the court’s decision was based on its own state constitution, 
its opinion quoted extensively from the Supreme Court’s balancing 
 
375. Id. 
376. Id. at 154. But see id. at 158–59 (Blackwell, J., concurring) (noting that the 
court’s opinion did not foreclose a statute requiring that some sex offenders 
be subjected to monitoring as a condition of lifetime probation). For 
holdings similar to Park, see State v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542, 546–47, 559, 
564, 565, 567 (N.C. 2019) (concluding, on remand from the Supreme Court, 
that the State had not met its burden of showing that mandatory lifetime 
GPS monitoring survived the balancing test with respect to recidivist sex 
offenders who were no longer on probation or supervised release, reasoning 
that lifetime participation in a sex offender registry does not diminish one’s 
expectation of privacy “in all other aspects of his daily life,” that electronic 
monitoring effects “a deep, if not unique, intrusion upon . . . protected 
Fourth Amendment interests,” and that the evidence of sex offender 
recidivism rates was “inconclusive” and the State had provided no evidence 
of the monitoring program’s “efficacy . . . in advancing any of its asserted 
legitimate State interests”); and State v. Ross, 815 S.E.2d 754, 757–59 (S.C. 
2018) (striking down a state statute requiring “automatic, mandatory” 
lifetime electronic monitoring for failing to register as a sex offender 
following a conviction for certain sex offenses involving minors on the 
grounds that the defendant had finished serving his sentence and was not 
on probation, and “a relatively innocent technical failure to register” was 
“a significantly different indicator of the likelihood of reoffending than a 
non-technical failure”; therefore requiring “an individualized inquiry” 
assessing whether monitoring was “an unreasonable search based on the 
totality of the circumstances” in the particular case). But see Grady, 831 
S.E.2d at 573 (Newby, J., dissenting) (concluding that the balancing test 
favored the State); Ross, 815 S.E.2d at 759 (Beatty, C.J., concurring in the 
result without opinion). 
377. Commonwealth v. Feliz, 119 N.E.3d 700, 703–04 (Mass. 2019). 
378. Id. at 710. 
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model opinions.379 In evaluating the reasonableness of the monitoring 
imposed in that case, the court conceded that probationers have a 
reduced expectation of privacy but noted that GPS devices impose “a 
far greater intrusion on the defendant’s liberty” than “traditional 
probation monitoring.”380 Despite acknowledging the “strong” 
governmental interest in safeguarding the community from sex offen–
ders, the court concluded that the balancing test favored the defendant, 
whose conviction involved “noncontact sex offenses,” because the 
Government had provided no evidence that he presented “a threat of 
reoffending” or violating the conditions of his probation.381 
The same court reached a similar conclusion in Commonwealth v. 
Norman, concluding that GPS tracking of a suspected drug dealer who 
was required as a condition of pretrial release to stay out of Boston did 
not survive the balancing test.382 Rejecting the argument that the 
defendant had voluntarily consented to the monitoring,383 the court 
reasoned that pretrial releasees have a greater expectation of privacy 
than probationers384 and that GPS tracking is the equivalent of a 
“modern-day ‘scarlet letter.’”385 On the Government’s side of the 
balance, the court thought that the GPS monitoring did not serve the 
bail statute’s purposes of ensuring the defendant’s presence at trial and 
protecting victims and witnesses.386 
But other courts assessing the constitutionality of electronic 
monitoring have weighed the competing interests in favor of the 
 
379. See id. at 709–11 (citing Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015) 
(per curiam); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013); Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 
118–20 (2001)). 
380. Id. at 713 (quoting Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 933 N.E.2d 925, 935 
(Mass. 2010)). 
381. Id. at 714–15. The court also rejected a special needs rationale for the 
monitoring. See id. at 710 n.17. But cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 
N.E.3d 669, 680–81 (Mass. 2019) (distinguishing Feliz where a probationer 
requested GPS tracking and had a history of recidivism). 
382. Commonwealth v. Norman, 142 N.E.3d 1, 3–4 (Mass. 2020). 
383. See id. at 6–7. 
384. See id. at 6. 
385. Id. at 9 (citation omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 985 
N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (2013)); see also Kate Weisburd, Sentenced to Sur–
veillance: Fourth Amendment Limits on Electronic Monitoring, 98 N.C. L. 
Rev. 717, 755 (2020) (documenting the “significant dignity costs” of GPS 
monitoring). 
386. See Norman, 142 N.E.3d at 9. For other cases analyzing conditions of 
pretrial release under the balancing approach, see supra notes 352–361 
and accompanying text. 
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government. In Belleau v. Wall, the Seventh Circuit upheld a Wisconsin 
statute requiring lifetime GPS monitoring for anyone released from civil 
commitment for a sex offense.387 Although the plaintiff was not on any 
form of supervised release, the court thought that he could not be 
“certified as harmless merely because he no longer is under any of the 
more familiar kinds of post-imprisonment restriction.”388 Rather, the 
court reasoned, pedophiles like the plaintiff were “predispose[d] . . . to 
commit sexually violent acts”389 and electronic monitoring could help 
reduce sex offenders’ recidivism rates.390 Finally, the Seventh Circuit 
argued that GPS monitoring was “less intrusive than a conventional 
search,” and that its “incremental” impact on the plaintiff’s privacy 
was “slight” given that his criminal record and home address were 
public information, and therefore his “privacy [had] already been 
severely curtailed as a result of his criminal activities.”391 
In Holland v. Rosen, a case challenging the constitutionality of New 
Jersey’s bail statute, the Third Circuit similarly found that the plaintiff 
was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim that home detention 
and electronic monitoring were unreasonable conditions of pretrial 
release on a charge that did not involve a sex offense.392 The court 
distinguished the GPS tracking in Grady on the grounds that Holland, 
unlike Grady, had consented to the monitoring.393 Then, relying on 
Maryland v. King, the court reasoned that Holland’s arrest for “a 
 
387. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016). 
388. Id. at 934. 
389. Id. at 932–33 (quoting psychologist’s evaluation). 
390. See id. at 936 (citing Stephen V. Gies, Randy Gainey, Marcia I. Cohen, 
Eoin Healy, Dan Duplantier, Martha Yeide, Alan Bekelman, 
Amanda Bobnis & Michael Hopps, Monitoring High-Risk Sex Offen–
ders with GPS Technology: An Evaluation of the California 
Supervision Program, Final Report, 3-11, 3-13 (2012)). But see 
Weisburd, supra note 385, at 723–24 (finding “no empirical evidence . . . that 
broadly applied electronic surveillance corresponds to greater public safety, 
increased rehabilitation, or lower recidivism rates,” and arguing that it may 
instead be “criminogenic, by focusing on perfect detection and enforcement” 
of “technical” violations of parole and probation conditions). 
391. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 937, 934–35 (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Kane, 
169 A.3d 762, 772–74 (Vt. 2017) (upholding GPS monitoring as a condition 
of probation under Knights and Samson). But see Weisburd, supra note 
385, at 754–55 (calling electronic monitoring “an unprecedented blow to 
privacy of the nonincarcerated” because, unlike traditional searches, it 
enables “law enforcement, with the click of a mouse, to access immense 
amounts of personal, otherwise private, information at any time of day and 
without notice to the defendant”). 
392. Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 302 (3d Cir. 2018). 
393. See id. at 301. 
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dangerous offense” (second-degree aggravated assault) reduced his 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and the State had “a substantial 
interest” in making sure arrestees do not flee before trial and a 
“‘legitimate and compelling’ interest” in preventing them from 
committing other crimes.394 
Although the constitutionality of electronic monitoring could be, 
and has been, evaluated under the special needs rubric,395 this is an area 
where the reasonableness-balancing model is likely to continue playing 
a role and generating disagreement among the lower courts. 
d. New Contexts 
In a few of the cases where defendants prevailed under the 
balancing test, the lower courts nevertheless extended the Supreme 
Court’s reasonableness-balancing model decisions by applying the 
balancing approach in different contexts. In United States v. Bain, for 
example, the police found a set of keys during a search incident to an 
arrest that took place outside of a residential building.396 They used the 
keys on the front door of the building and three different apartments 
inside the building to ascertain where Bain lived and then obtained a 
search warrant for his apartment.397 In concluding that the balancing 
test favored the defendant, the First Circuit rejected the Government’s 
argument that “testing a key in a lock” is a “‘minor’ or ‘minimal’” 
intrusion; rather, the court responded, the “key point” is that the police 
made a warrantless entry into the curtilage of the defendant’s residence 
“solely to gather information to be used in building a criminal case 
against him.”398 Although the Seventh Circuit had reached a contrary 
conclusion in United States v. Concepcion, reasoning that the 
defendant’s address was information law enforcement “could have 
ascertained in many other ways” and therefore “no secret,”399 the First 
 
394. Id. at 301–02 (quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463, 452–53 (2013) 
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987))). 
395. See supra notes 302, 373, 381 and accompanying text. 
396. United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2017). 
397. See id. 
398. Id. at 17, 19. 
399. United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991). 
Concepcion predated the Supreme Court’s three balancing model cases, but 
the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the Fourth Amendment mandates that 
searches be “reasonable,” and, while “a warrant may be an essential 
ingredient of reasonableness much of the time,” it is not required “for less 
intrusive searches.” Id. at 1172. Cf. United States v. Correa, 908 F.3d 208, 
219, 212 (7th Cir. 2018) (relying on Concepcion in allowing DEA agents to 
determine which building was linked to a garage door opener, “at least where 
the search disclose[d] . . . only an address, not any meaningful private 
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Circuit thought that argument cut the other way. The “ease” of finding 
another source for the information undermined the “need to access the 
home” moreso than it “minimize[d] the nature of the intrusion,” the 
court explained, concluding that the governmental interests did not 
outweigh the defendant’s privacy interests.400 Although the opinion 
focused on a balancing analysis, the court also mentioned that exigency 
is the “main exception[]” for warrantless searches of homes and no 
exigent circumstances existed there.401 
In Ioane v. Hodges, the Ninth Circuit rejected a qualified immunity 
defense in a § 1983 case on the grounds that a jury could reasonably 
find that an IRS agent violated the Fourth Amendment when, during 
the execution of a search warrant for the Ioane residence, she monitored 
Shelly Ioane’s use of the bathroom.402 The court found that Ioane did 
not have a reduced expectation of privacy, noting that she was neither 
under detention nor “the subject” of the warrant and had a “heightened 
privacy interest[]” in her home.403 Moreover, the court thought that “the 
manner of [the] intrusion” favored Ioane because the agent “stood 
facing” her in the bathroom rather than using “a manner of obser–
vation” that was “obscured” or “restricted.”404 Weighing the Govern-
ment’s side of the balance, the Ninth Circuit relied on the holding in 
Ybarra v. Illinois that a search warrant does not necessarily authorize 
the search of individuals found on the premises405 and distinguished 
other warrant-presumption model opinions allowing police to frisk 
potentially dangerous individuals and to detain residents while 
executing a search warrant.406 
 
information about the interior or contents of the garage,” and where the 
garage was “shared by many residents of [a] building”). 
400. Bain, 874 F.3d at 18. 
401. Id. at 16–17, 19. 
402. Ioane v. Hodges, 939 F.3d 945, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2019). See generally 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 800, 818 & n.30 (1982) (granting qualified 
immunity to executive-branch officials defending civil rights suits filed 
under § 1983 so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known”). 
403. Ioane, 939 F.3d at 954, 956. 
404. Id. at 954. 
405. See id. at 955 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91–92 (1979)). 
406. See id. at 954–56 (rejecting destruction of evidence concerns because the 
Ioanes were told they were free to leave during the search, and dismissing 
safety concerns because the agents had already searched the bathroom for 
weapons and had apparently monitored the Ioanes for about half an hour 
without frisking them); cf. id. at 960–61 (Bea, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the majority’s finding that 
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By a vote of four to three, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State 
v. Henning applied a balancing analysis in striking down a state statute 
that allowed police to make a traffic stop and check the driver’s license 
whenever they spotted a car with a “special series registration” license 
plate—a plate issued when someone who will be driving the vehicle has 
had her license suspended or revoked but is still permitted to drive for 
limited purposes, for example, to work or to school.407 Citing both 
Knights and the administrative inspection opinion in Delaware v. 
Prouse for the balancing test,408 the majority acknowledged the 
“‘minimally intrusive’” nature of the seizure at issue there and the 
State’s “obvious and substantial interest” in safeguarding the 
community from “repeat drunken drivers.”409 Nevertheless, the court 
thought the State had not provided sufficient justification for ignoring 
the “general” individualized suspicion requirement and for subjecting 
drivers in cars with special series plates to “repeated stops at the 
unchecked discretion” of the police rather than relying on “more 
conventional means” of arresting drunk drivers.410 
Although these three courts ultimately concluded that the 
governmental intrusion did not survive the balancing test, they did 
choose to extend the reasonableness-balancing model to contexts 
beyond those featured in the Supreme Court’s precedents. And they did 
so despite the fact that they each found warrant-presumption model 
case law that could have justified invalidating the law enforcement 
conduct in question. 
Aside from these three cases, the other defendant-friendly lower 
court opinions discussed in this Section unequivocally hesitated to give 
the Supreme Court’s reasonableness-balancing model a broad reading—
refusing to apply a balancing approach, requiring prosecutors to satisfy 
both models, or balancing in favor of the defendant. But most of those 
decisions were met with resistance, either within the court itself or from 
 
the agent’s action was “unreasonable” was “likely” correct, but disagreeing 
that the constitutional violation was sufficiently clearly established to 
justify the denial of qualified immunity; nevertheless concurring in the result 
on the grounds that the agent’s actions were inconsistent with Ybarra). 
407. State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d 379, 384–85 (Minn. 2003). But see id. at 387 
(Meyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State should prevail under the 
balancing approach). 
408. Id. at 383–84 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 118–19 (2001); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). The 
court also noted that Prouse required reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. 
See id. at 383. 
409. Id. at 386 (quoting Ascher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 
(Minn. 1994)). 
410. Id. at 385–86. 
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other courts. The Section that follows continues to explore other lower 
court rulings that have applied the balancing model in new arenas. 
4. Expanding the Reach of the Balancing Model 
In addition to the three decisions discussed in the previous Section, 
some lower court opinions have cited the Supreme Court’s reason–
ableness-balancing model trilogy in a few other discrete areas: foreign 
intelligence and national security searches, weapons seizures, roadblocks 
and group seizures, and BAC testing in DUI cases.411 This Section 
analyzes those issues in turn, concluding that, to date, the lower courts 
have obviously extended the balancing approach only in cases involving 
foreign intelligence and national security searches. 
a. Foreign Intelligence/National Security Searches  
The one context in which the reasonableness-balancing model has 
clearly been influential in expanding law enforcement powers in federal 
cases is foreign intelligence and national security searches. Even here, 
however, the federal case law has not universally favored the 
government. 
The Second and Seventh Circuits have relied on a balancing 
approach to assess the constitutionality of extraterritorial searches of 
American citizens conducted by United States officials. The Second 
Circuit led the way in United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings 
of United States Embassies in East Africa), extending the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez that the Fourth 
Amendment does not govern American officials’ overseas searches of 
foreign nationals412 and recognizing that a foreign intelligence exception 
to the warrant requirement applies to overseas searches of American 
citizens.413 Noting that the Court warned in Verdugo-Urquidez that an 
American search warrant would be “a dead letter” in any other 
 
411. For a few other miscellaneous cases, see United States v. Seerden, 916 F.3d 
360, 365 (4th Cir. 2019) (relying on Samson’s balancing test in discussing 
the search of a cell phone belonging to a Navy SEAL and cautioning that 
the competing interests relevant in assessing military and civilian searches 
are “different” given the “significant interest in maintaining order and 
control” in the military, but ultimately finding no need to conduct a 
balancing analysis because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applied); and United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 583–84 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(en banc) (applying the Knights balancing test to evaluate a protective 
sweep), overruled on other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 
(2011). For further discussion of Gould and protective sweeps, see supra 
notes 172–175 and accompanying text. 
412. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990). 
413. United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings of United States 
Embassies in East Africa), 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
The Origins and Legacy of the Fourth Amendment                 
Reasonableness-balancing Model 
232 
country,414 the Second Circuit reasoned that the Warrant Clause does 
not govern extraterritorial searches of American citizens. Rather, the 
court held, these searches “need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirement of reasonableness.”415 
Interestingly, the court refused to rely on other federal appellate 
cases that had recognized a foreign intelligence warrant exception under 
the warrant-presumption model416 on the grounds that the warrant 
exception endorsed by those courts required a showing that the primary 
purpose of the search was to gather foreign intelligence information.417 
Relying instead on Samson and Knights, the Second Circuit applied the 
totality-of-the-circumstances balancing test in concluding that the 
extraterritorial search at issue there was reasonable.418 
The Seventh Circuit subsequently endorsed the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning in United States v. Stokes.419 And, in United States v. Vilar, 
the Second Circuit refused to limit the foreign intelligence exception to 
cases involving terrorism or “similarly horrific crime[s]” and applied the 
balancing test in upholding the search of a London warehouse during a 
securities fraud investigation.420 According to these courts, therefore, 
the constitutionality of extraterritorial searches of American citizens is 
determined by applying the balancing test to the facts of the particular 
case.421 
 
414. Id. at 168–69 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274). 
415. Id. at 167. 
416. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914–15 (4th 
Cir. 1980); see also In re Certified Question of Law, 858 F.3d 591, 605–07 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing additional cases recognizing a foreign 
intelligence warrant exception); cf. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. 
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972) (refusing to recognize a warrant 
exception for “domestic . . . national security,” but leaving open “the issues 
which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their 
agents”). 
417. See Odeh, 552 F.3d at 171–72. But see In re Directives Pursuant to 
Section 105b of the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the primary purpose requirement given that 
the Patriot Act replaced “the talismanic phrase ‘primary purpose’” with 
“‘a significant purpose’” (quoting In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 
717, 742–45 (D.C. Cir. 2002))). 
418. See Odeh, 552 F.3d at 172–73. 
419. United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 893 (7th Cir. 2013). 
420. United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 86 (2d Cir. 2013). 
421. See Stokes, 726 F.3d at 893–94; Odeh, 552 F.3d at 172; cf. United States v. 
Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641, 664, 666–67 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that a 
warrant was not required to continue monitoring communications from a 
person in the United States whose identity was incidentally uncovered while 
tracking a foreign national’s email communications, and then going on to 
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Although the Ninth Circuit likewise used the balancing test in a 
national security context in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. 
United States Department of the Treasury, the court thought the 
balancing process weighed against the Government.422 The court 
therefore ruled in favor of a foundation when its assets were frozen after 
it had been designated a terrorist organization by the Treasury 
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).423 After 
rejecting the Government’s special needs argument,424 the Ninth Circuit 
turned to “the ‘general reasonableness’ test.”425 Assuming without 
deciding that the reasonableness model applies to seizures as well as 
searches, the court of appeals explained that, although the govern–
mental interest in combating terrorism is “extremely high,” that “vital 
mission” did not mean OFAC’s blocking orders were “per se reasonable” 
in every case.426 Rather, the court thought that OFAC should seek a 
warrant “in the normal course.”427 Moreover, unlike the Supreme 
Court’s balancing model opinions, which involved “greatly diminished” 
expectations of privacy, the Ninth Circuit noted that OFAC’s jurisdic–
tion is unlimited, and therefore the individuals and entities “potentially 
subject to seizure” orders do not have a reduced expectation of privacy 
because “that class includes everyone.”428 
Two D.C. Circuit opinions likewise engaged in a balancing analysis 
in the national security context, but those decisions seemingly endorsed 
the position described above429 that requires prosecutors to satisfy both 
the warrant-presumption model and the reasonableness model.430 
 
find the monitoring reasonable under the balancing test); United States v. 
Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 438, 441 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to the monitoring of a foreign national’s email 
communications that incidentally uncovered email messages from persons, 
including the defendant, who were in the United States, but observing that, 
even if the defendant had “a Fourth Amendment right in the incidentally 
collected communications,” he would lose under the balancing test and the 
search was therefore reasonable). 
422. Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 
965, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2012). 
423. See id. at 970. 
424. See id. at 990–93. 
425. Id. at 993. 
426. Id. at 994. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. 
429. See supra notes 334–343 and accompanying text. 
430. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010–12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (analogizing to 
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Although the D.C. Circuit opinions therefore do not unambiguously 
broaden the reach of the Supreme Court’s reasonableness-balancing 
model trilogy, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have applied 
the model to national security cases. 
This Section next turns to several additional areas where other 
federal court opinions may have made inroads in extending the 
balancing analysis. 
b. Weapons Seizures  
A few federal courts have arguably expanded the reasonableness-
balancing model to cases involving the temporary seizure of weapons 
discovered during a lawful police entry. But the reasoning of these 
opinions is somewhat opaque, they did not explicitly rely on the 
trilogy’s balancing analysis, and it is not evident to what extent they 
were applying a balancing approach not authorized by the warrant-
presumption model. 
In United States v. Lewis, the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether 
officers who were questioning the defendant in his workplace about a 
person of interest violated the Fourth Amendment when they briefly 
seized a handgun they saw on a shelf to check whether it was loaded.431 
Starting off by describing the warrant-presumption model, the court 
rejected the Government’s argument that the seizure fell within the 
plain view exception to the warrant requirement on the grounds that 
the police did not have probable cause to believe the weapon was 
 
the special needs cases in recognizing a foreign intelligence warrant exception 
for national security surveillance of foreign governments and their agents 
who are “reasonably believed to be . . . outside the United States,” but then 
citing Samson and Knights, as well as several Supreme Court warrant-
presumption model precedents, in applying “[t]he totality of the 
circumstances model” and “balanc[ing] the interests at stake” to determine 
whether the surveillance was “a sufficiently reasonable exercise of 
governmental power” to comply with “the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable–
ness requirement”); see also In re Certified Question of Law, 858 F.3d 591, 
593–94, 607, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (describing In re Directives 
as “virtually control[ling]” and analogizing to the special needs cases in 
concluding that a warrant based on probable cause is not required when a 
pen register is used on someone in this country who is “reasonably believed 
to be engaged in clandestine intelligence activities” for another country and 
that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court may authorize a pen register 
that records numbers dialed during a phone call, even though it might 
incidentally collect “content information” (such as passwords or credit card 
numbers); then going on to say that the Fourth Amendment still had a “role 
to play,” quoting the touchstone mantra in holding that “[t]he textual 
command of reasonableness . . . still governs,” and weighing the relevant 
competing interests in analyzing “the question of reasonableness”). 
431. United States v. Lewis, 864 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 2017). 
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evidence of a crime.432 The court then moved on to the prosecution’s 
alternative argument that “officer-safety concerns justified the warrant-
less seizure.”433 Here, again, the Eighth Circuit continued applying the 
warrant-presumption model, distinguishing cases allowing warrantless 
seizures where police are executing a search warrant or have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.434 
But the court also used the touchstone language and set out the 
balancing test, although citing only warrant-presumption model cases 
in support and therefore still not obviously straying from that 
approach.435 The opinion then explained that seizures generally require 
a warrant but that there are “sometimes” exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.436 Here, the Eighth Circuit did quote the statement in 
Maryland v. King that a special need, reduced expectation of privacy, 
minimal intrusion, “or the like” may justify a warrantless seizure.437 The 
court did not explicitly rely on King’s balancing approach, however, 
though it did go on to weigh the competing interests.438 
In considering the Government’s side of the equation, the court 
thought that “Terry’s principles” were “relevant” even in the absence 
of reasonable suspicion.439 The Eighth Circuit gratuitously added that 
law enforcement officials’ “investigatory interest” can vary from case to 
case depending on what type of crime they suspect, suggesting a 
balancing approach that turns on the facts of a particular case.440 But 
in the end the court relied on Terry in concluding that the “strong 
interest” in safeguarding officers while “they legitimately investigate 
any crime” allowed them to seize a weapon found in plain view if they 
 
432. See id. at 943–44. 
433. Id. at 943. 
434. See id. at 944–46. 
435. See id. at 945 (citing County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 
1546 (2017) (excessive force); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1983) 
(Terry frisk of a car)). 
436. Id. 
437. Id. (quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013)). For additional 
discussion of this language, see supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text.  
438. See Lewis, 864 F.3d at 945–46 (explaining that the intrusiveness of the 
seizure was “minimal” and “substantially less significant” than a Terry frisk 
given its “narrow purpose” and “short” length, and that Terry’s “immediate 
interest in officer safety” was equally implicated in both cases although its 
“secondary . . . interest” in “investigating and preventing potentially ongoing 
crime” was “more difficult” to assess because the officer in Terry had reason–
able suspicion an armed robbery was imminent). 
439. Id. at 946. 
440. Id. 
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had a reasonable suspicion their “‘safety or that of others was in 
danger.’”441 The Eighth Circuit therefore articulated what appears to 
be a categorical rule, following the balancing process used in the Terry 
line of cases to determine the permissible scope of a stop and frisk. 
Moreover, the court indicated that its conclusion “agree[d] with” and 
was “consistent with” other lower court opinions allowing “intrusions 
justified by officer safety concerns,” several of which were clearly 
applying the warrant-presumption model.442 
But the other two cases cited by the Eighth Circuit are not so clear. 
In the first, United States v. Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit, though 
finding that the plain view exception did not apply, nevertheless 
allowed police officers who were responding to a 911 report of “a violent 
domestic dispute” to seize a shotgun found during their protective 
sweep of the residence.443 The court reasoned that “domestic disputes 
often involve high emotions and can quickly escalate to violence,” and 
“[c]ommon sense dictates” that a dangerous weapon should be unloaded 
and “at least temporarily” secured.444 Although the court did not rely 
on any particular warrant exception here, it did not cite the 
reasonableness-balancing model cases or engage in a balancing analysis. 
And, in a footnote, the court clarified that it was not endorsing every 
seizure of a weapon but was merely holding that police officers perform–
ing a protective sweep may temporarily seize a weapon to enable them 
to “safely conduct their investigation.”445 Like the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion in Lewis, then, the Fifth Circuit seemed to be announcing a 
categorical rule about the permissible reach of a protective sweep. 
The final case the Eighth Circuit cited in Lewis was the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Gordon, which in turn relied on 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez in concluding that police could 
seize a loaded shotgun they found while investigating a 911 domestic 
violence call.446 But one of the officers impermissibly kept the gun after 
he had left the premises, only to learn shortly thereafter the defendant 
 
441. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). The court found that 
the seizure of Lewis’s handgun was not supported by reasonable suspicion 
because the officers did not suspect him of any crime and did not know 
whether the gun was loaded. See id. at 947. 
442. Id. at 946 (citing United States v. Poe, 462 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(applying the exigent circumstances exception); United States v. Bishop, 
338 F.3d 623, 628 (6th Cir. 2003) (relying on Terry)). 
443. United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2010). 
444. Id. at 408. 
445. Id. at 408 n.2. 
446. United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 71 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Rodriguez, 
601 F.3d at 408). 
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had a prior felony conviction that made possession of the weapon 
illegal.447 Noting that the Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreason–
able searches, the Tenth Circuit asserted that courts often allow “de 
minimis intrusions into a person’s possessory interest in property, and 
even liberty interests.”448 The court then set out the balancing test, 
concluding that the officer’s continued possession of the weapon for the 
“few minutes” that intervened between leaving the house and 
discovering the defendant was a felon was a permissible “de minimis 
intrusion.”449 
The court did not mention the Supreme Court’s reasonableness-
balancing model trilogy, instead citing the Court’s earlier opinion in 
United States v. Jacobsen for both the balancing analysis and the pur–
ported permissibility of minor intrusions.450 But Jacobsen, in applying 
a balancing test and holding that performing a chemical test on “a trace 
amount” of a white powder that had been lawfully seized “at most” had 
“only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest” and was 
therefore reasonable, relied on precedent that did not depart substan–
tially from the warrant-presumption model.451 Moreover, Jacobsen’s 
reasoning was implicitly undermined by the Court’s subsequent refusal 
in Arizona v. Hicks to allow a “‘cursory inspection’” that did not rise 
to the level of a “‘full-blown search’” on a standard lower than probable 
cause because the Court was “unwilling” to create “a new thicket of 
Fourth Amendment law” depending on the intrusiveness of a search.452 
The precedent cited by the Tenth Circuit therefore may not have 
justified its reliance on a balancing approach,453 but, of the three 
 
447. See id. at 72. 
448. Id. 
449. Id. at 73. 
450. See id. at 72–73 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125–26 
(1984)). 
451. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 & n.26 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1046–47 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591–92 (1974) 
(plurality opinion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968); Camara v. 
Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
452. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (quoting id. at 335 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting)); see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (relying 
on Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969), in refusing to allow police 
to transport a suspect to the station for fingerprinting without probable 
cause even though fingerprinting involves “a much less serious intrusion” 
than other searches). 
453. The Tenth Circuit’s only other support for the constitutionality of de 
minimis intrusions was three lower court cases, two of which were superseded 
by the Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 
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weapons seizure opinions, it came closest to extending the reach of the 
reasonableness-balancing model—though without explicitly citing the 
three Supreme Court opinions applying that model. 
Although weapons seizures might therefore be a potential area of 
expansion for the reasonableness-balancing approach, the courts of 
appeals were not entirely transparent in their reasoning in these cases, 
and they did not expressly rely on the Supreme Court’s reasonableness-
balancing model. It is not clear, therefore, how far these opinions 
deviated from other lower court decisions that have resolved similar 
cases under the warrant-presumption model, concluding, for example, 
that the presence of a weapon creates reasonable suspicion of the crime 
of unlawful possession454 and reasonable suspicion of danger to the police 
even if the possession is lawful.455 
c. Roadblocks and Group Seizures 
As discussed above, several Supreme Court opinions have used the 
special needs rubric to approve of checkpoints that served some purpose 
other than ordinary criminal law enforcement and survived the 
 
354–55 (2015), that even brief extensions of a traffic stop are impermissible. 
See United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 220 (4th Cir. 2008). For further discussion of 
Rodriguez, see supra notes 275–277 and accompanying text. The final case 
cited by the Tenth Circuit applied the warrant-presumption model. See 
United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 795–98 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 
697–98 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per 
curiam)) (allowing law enforcement official who was searching for a fugitive 
to order the defendant to show his hands). For further discussion of 
Summers, Graham, and Mimms, see supra notes 101–103, 110–113, 189–192 
and accompanying text.  
454. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 487–90 (10th Cir. 2013); 
State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 394–97 (Minn. 2008). But see, e.g., 
Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131–32 (6th Cir. 
2015) (holding that possession of a weapon in a state that permits the open 
carry of firearms is not enough to create reasonable suspicion of a crime); 
United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013) (same). 
455. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 700–01 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983); Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). For other federal court opinions that 
predate the Supreme Court’s reasonableness-balancing model trilogy and 
allow the temporary seizure of a weapon during the execution of a search 
warrant in order to protect officer safety, without expressly invoking any 
warrant exception or engaging in a balancing analysis, see United States v. 
Timpani, 665 F.2d 1, 5 n.8 (1st Cir. 1981), and United States v. Malachesen, 
597 F.2d 1232, 1234–35 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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balancing test applied in administrative inspection cases.456 A few 
federal appellate courts have cited the Court’s reasonableness-balancing 
model precedents in upholding roadblocks and other group seizures 
aimed at apprehending a fleeing criminal, thus potentially expanding 
the trilogy into another new arena. But, as with the weapons seizure 
cases, how far these opinions deviated from the warrant-presumption 
model is not obvious. 
In Palacios v. Burge, the Second Circuit applied the reasonableness-
balancing test in allowing police to detain the male patrons of a bar so 
that two stabbing victims could identify their assailants.457 But, as 
noted above, Palacios is an opinion that apparently requires the 
government to satisfy both the warrant-presumption model and the 
reasonableness-balancing model.458 Before engaging in its balancing 
analysis, the court referenced exigent circumstances, interpreting 
dictum from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Indianapolis v. Edmond 
as “recognizing circumstances involving ‘exigencies’ that permit seizures 
without individualized suspicion.”459 
In Edmond, the administrative inspection opinion that refused to 
allow a suspicionless checkpoint “primarily for the ordinary enterprise 
of investigating crimes,” the Court went on to add the following dictum: 
“[o]f course, there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement 
checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some 
emergency, relate to ordinary crime control.”460 By way of example, the 
Edmond Court mentioned “scenarios” that involve “exigencies,” such 
as “an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent 
terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by 
way of a particular route.”461 But, contrary to the Second Circuit’s 
 
456. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004) (information-gathering 
roadblock); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) 
(sobriety checkpoint); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 
(1976) (immigration checkpoint). For further discussion of Martinez-Fuerte, 
Sitz, and Lidster, see supra notes 140–146, 220–234, 247–256 and accom–
panying text. 
457. Palacios v. Burge, 589 F.3d 556, 559, 563–66 (2d Cir. 2009) (permitting 
the detention of about 170 men for approximately forty minutes, which 
led to the identification of six individuals). 
458. See supra notes 340–343 and accompanying text.  
459. Palacios, 589 F.3d at 562–63 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
44 (2000)). For further discussion of Edmond, see supra notes 229–232 and 
accompanying text. 
460. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. 
461. Id.; cf. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424–25 (distinguishing Edmond from “police 
activity” aimed at “crowd control or public safety,” for which “the concept 
of individualized suspicion has little role to play”). 
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assertion in Palacios,462 the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement 
requires some level of individualized suspicion, and nothing in Edmond’s 
special needs analysis undermines that precedent.463 
In applying the balancing test, the Second Circuit also found 
“instructive” the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Lidster because 
both cases involved the “need to acquire information about a recent 
crime that had occurred in the vicinity.”464 Although Lidster is similar 
to group seizure cases in that, “by definition, the concept of individ–
ualized suspicion has little role to play” when police cannot narrow 
down which cars or individuals were involved in a crime, key to 
Lidster’s approval of a checkpoint seeking information about a recent 
accident was the special need of asking motorists to help identify others 
who might have been involved.465 By contrast, roadblocks aimed at 
apprehending fleeing criminals are targeting the occupants of the cars 
themselves and therefore difficult to distinguish from ordinary criminal 
law enforcement.466 
In United States v. Paetsch, the Tenth Circuit allowed police to 
barricade an intersection to catch a fleeing bank robber, thereby 
detaining twenty-nine people riding in twenty cars for about half an 
 
462. See Palacios, 589 F.3d at 562 (stating that “[i]ndividualized suspicion is 
not needed” in exigent circumstances). 
463. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (authorizing a 
warrantless entry into a home when police have “an objectively reasonable 
basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently 
threatened with such injury”); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) 
(per curiam) (pointing out that “police officers need either a warrant or 
probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry 
into a home”); cf. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331–32 (2001) (listing 
the existence of probable cause as the first of four “circumstances, which . . . 
consider[ed] in combination,” permitted officers to impound a residence while 
they sought a warrant); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332–33 (1990) 
(observing that police had an arrest warrant, as well as probable cause to 
believe the defendant was home, in allowing a protective sweep of the 
residence). See generally Kinports, supra note 144, at 628–31. 
464. Palacios, 589 F.3d at 564. 
465. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423–24. For further discussion of Lidster, see supra 
notes 247–256 and accompanying text.  
466. But see United States v. Whitehead, 567 F. App’x 758, 767 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(per curiam) (concluding that a checkpoint “focused on one particular crime 
and one particular suspect” was “not for general crime detection” and there–
fore different from the narcotics checkpoints struck down in Edmond); 
United States v. Abbott, 265 F. App’x 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(likewise distinguishing a roadblock “tailored to detect evidence of a 
particular criminal wrongdoing” from one aimed at “general crime control”). 
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hour.467 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged 
that suspicionless intrusions must be linked to a special need, but 
Paetsch read the Edmond dictum as equating emergencies with special 
needs and thereby allowing roadblocks without “individualized 
suspicion of a particular motorist.”468 But characterizing exigent cir–
cumstances as a special need that dispenses with any individualized 
suspicion requirement “conflat[es]” the warrant exceptions for exigent 
circumstances and special needs searches, and circumvents the Court’s 
traditional view that the exigent circumstances exception requires 
individualized suspicion.469 
The Tenth Circuit went on in Paetsch to caution that the fact that 
the barricade fell within the Edmond dictum did not “entirely resolve” 
the case because the court must “still . . . examine” whether the 
barricade was “reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.”470 
Although the opinion had previously quoted the touchstone mantra 
from Samson,471 the court did not otherwise cite the reasonableness-
balancing model precedents but instead concluded that the officers’ 
actions satisfied the three-factor balancing test set out in Brown v. 
Texas.472  
Evaluating whether decisions like these have expanded the 
reasonableness-balancing model precedents is a bit tricky. Both the 
Second and Tenth Circuits were seemingly of the view that the 
prosecution must satisfy both Fourth Amendment models. Palacios and 
Paetsch may have relied on faulty reasoning, but they do not seem to 
have extended the reach of the balancing model. 
 Moreover, the en banc Fourth Circuit in United States v. Curry 
recently “decline[d] the government’s invitation to apply a free-form 
balancing test” in evaluating whether police responding to shots fired 
in a residential neighborhood were entitled to stop five to eight men in 
the vicinity, one of whom was found to be a felon in possession of a 
 
467. United States v. Paetsch, 782 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2015). 
468. Id. at 1169–70. 
469. United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 320 n.4 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) 
(quoting United States v. Curry, 937 F.3d 363, 378 (4th Cir. 2019) (Floyd, 
J., dissenting), rev'd, 965 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc)). 
470. Paetsch, 782 F.3d at 1170. 
471. See id. at 1169 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006)). 
472. See id. at 1170 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)); see also 
United States v. Arnold, 835 F.3d 833, 838–39 (8th Cir. 2016) (“adopt[ing] 
Paetsch’s reasoning,” quoting the touchstone language from Samson, briefly 
mentioning the Edmond dictum, and “appl[ying] the balancing test” laid 
out in Brown v. Texas in allowing a roadblock designed to apprehend a 
fleeing bank robber). For further discussion of Brown, see supra notes 234–
245 and accompanying text. 
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weapon (but not linked to the shooting).473 Relying instead on the 
exigent circumstances exception, the Fourth Circuit ultimately refused 
to “recalibrate the ‘balance’ struck” in Terry and allow suspicionless 
seizures in a case, unlike Palacios and Paetsch, where the police could 
not “narrowly target the seizures based on specific information of a 
known crime and a controlled geographic area.”474 
Even if other courts disagree with the Fourth Circuit, Edmond, 
which was decided the year before Knights, laid the groundwork for 
Palacios and Paetsch, and the reasoning underlying the cryptic Edmond 
dictum is not entirely clear. This is an area in which the Supreme Court 
is “struggling,”475 and the “few” other lower court opinions that involve 
similar roadblocks are “not particularly helpful.”476 It could be that the 
Edmond dictum reflects the Court’s willingness to consider a new 
categorical exception to the warrant requirement: a variant of a Terry 
stop that allows a seizure of multiple persons or vehicles in cases 
involving less reason to believe each individual who is seized is 
connected to the crime, but greater exigency, a higher level of certainty 
that a serious crime occurred, and a lesser degree of intrusion given that 
the seizure is brief and no one person is singled out.477 Alternatively, 
roadblocks and other group seizures could be an area in which the 
reasonableness-balancing model will be extended. 
d. Testing DUI Arrestees  
The one area in which state courts have attempted to expand the 
reach of the reasonableness-balancing model is in cases allowing BAC 
testing following a DUI arrest.478 But the state courts have not all 
 
473. Curry, 965 F.3d at 327, 316–18. 
474. Id. at 330, 325–26. 
475. 1 Dressler & Michaels, supra note 14, § 18.04[B][2], at 303. 
476. 4 LaFave, supra note 47, § 9.7(a), at 970. 
477. See id. at 972 (also noting that “somewhat different ingredients are involved” 
in the balancing analysis here compared to a traditional Terry stop); see also 
id. at 973–74 (reporting that the roadblocks upheld by the lower courts “with 
rare exception” have involved serious crimes); cf. Christopher Slobogin, The 
Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 603, 612 
(2007) (suggesting that “generalized suspicion” should suffice for “group 
searches,” with a lesser standard of proof required for less invasive intrusions 
like roadblocks). 
478. See State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302, 309–10 (N.D. 2015) (using what the 
court called “the general reasonableness requirement” to uphold a DUI 
arrestee’s conviction for refusing to submit to a BAC test, and reasoning 
that drivers have a reduced expectation of privacy “with respect to 
enforcement of drunk-driving laws” because they are “presumed to know the 
laws governing the operation of a motor vehicle”), rev’d and remanded, 136 
S. Ct. 2160 (2016); see also Williams v. State, 167 So. 3d 483, 492–94 (Fla. 
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viewed the competing interests in the same light,479 and, at least for the 
moment, the Supreme Court seems to have fended off efforts to extend 
the balancing model to DUI cases. 
In holding that police may perform breathalyzer but not blood tests 
when searching DUI suspects incident to arrest, the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Birchfield v. North Dakota impliedly rejected the approach 
taken by the lower courts that had relied on a balancing test to assess 
the constitutionality of those searches.480 Although Birchfield instead 
chose to analyze the case under the warrant-presumption model’s 
exception for searches incident to arrest (without explanation, of 
course), these state court rulings did represent an attempt on the part 
of the lower courts to broaden the reach of the Supreme Court’s three 
balancing model opinions. 
This Part’s discussion of Fourth Amendment case law after 
Maryland v. King suggests that, to date, the reasonableness-balancing 
model trilogy has had only a modest impact. The Supreme Court has 
continued to follow the warrant-presumption model in assessing the 
constitutionality of searches and seizures, although its per curiam 
opinion in Grady v. North Carolina suggested in dictum that the 
balancing model might be useful in cases involving electronic monitor–
ing of offenders.481 
 
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (applying Maryland v. King’s balancing approach in 
affirming a conviction for refusing a breathalyzer and allowing the testing 
under “a general reasonableness test” because “a breath test is minimally 
intrusive,” the State had an implied consent statute, the defendant was 
“driving on a public road,” and he was under arrest), vacated and remanded, 
No. SC15-1417, 2016 WL 6637817 (Fla. Nov. 9, 2016); Beylund v. Levi, 859 
N.W.2d 403, 412, 414 (N.D. 2015) (relying on its previous decision in 
Birchfield in rejecting an unconstitutional-conditions challenge to a statute 
criminalizing DUI arrestees’ refusal of BAC tests), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). 
479. In State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals struck down a state statute that allowed 
warrantless blood draws following DWI arrests involving “certain aggra–
vating factors,” such as two prior DWI convictions. Although the court took 
the view that “a general Fourth Amendment balancing test” should not 
determine the statute’s constitutionality, it went on to conclude that a 
balancing analysis would favor the defendant because “compelled physical 
intrusion beneath the skin” invades “significant privacy interests” and the 
State had “no compelling need” to address the drunk driving problem with 
warrantless blood draws when warrants are “often readily available.” Id. at 
808, 811. But see id. at 815–16 (Keller, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State 
should prevail under the balancing test). For a description of the majority’s 
rejection of the balancing model, see supra notes 325–329 and accompanying 
text. 
480. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184. For further discussion of Birchfield, see 
supra notes 286–293 and accompanying text. 
481. See supra notes 298–302 and accompanying text.  
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A survey of the lower court decisions that have cited the Supreme 
Court’s reasonableness-balancing model opinions reveals that the 
prosecution has prevailed in most of the cases that have arisen in the 
same contexts as the trilogy—probationer and parolee searches and 
DNA testing—and that some lower courts have accepted Grady’s 
implicit invitation to use a balancing analysis to evaluate the 
constitutionality of GPS tracking of offenders. But, even here, decisions 
favoring defendants can be found. 
In addition, some lower courts have refused to apply the balancing 
framework, have required the prosecution to satisfy both the 
reasonableness-balancing model and the warrant-presumption model, 
and have concluded that defendants prevailed under the balancing test. 
And although some lower courts have arguably attempted to extend 
the balancing approach to a few other discrete contexts, the cases are 
few in number and in all but one area have not led to an obvious 
expansion of the trilogy because the courts were not clearly balancing 
outside the warrant-presumption framework or their efforts were 
rebuffed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, with the one exception of 
foreign intelligence and national security searches, the lower courts have 
not obviously taken advantage of the trilogy to replace the warrant-
presumption model and aggressively broaden the reach of the 
reasonableness-balancing model. 
C. The Future of the Reasonableness-balancing Model 
The fact that the lower courts’ application of the reasonableness-
balancing model has not been as one-sided as the Supreme Court’s does 
not discount the dangers associated with the balancing approach. Most 
of the defendant-friendly lower court opinions that either refused to 
engage in a balancing analysis or weighed the competing interests 
against the government provoked disagreement, either within the court 
itself482 or with other courts,483 and therefore could just as easily have 
been decided the other way. Moreover, each of the cases where the 
balancing process favored the defendant484—and even some where it 
favored the prosecution485—could have been resolved under the 
warrant-presumption model instead of the reasonableness-balancing 
approach. Although the reasonableness-balancing model has not yet 
 
482. See supra notes 315, 325, 338, 352, 366, 370, 376, 406, 407 and 
accompanying text. 
483. See supra notes 344, 347–348, 358–361, 387–394, 399, 478–479 and 
accompanying text. 
484. See supra notes 326, 339, 353, 367, 373, 381, 383, 401, 405–406, 408, 424 
and accompanying text. 
485. See supra notes 175, 416–417, 430, 454–455, 477, 480 and accompanying 
text. 
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made substantial inroads on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
lower court record confirms that a great deal of ambiguity surrounds 
both when and how the model should be applied. 
This uncertainty should come as no surprise. The Supreme Court 
has never offered any hint as to why it resorted to pure balancing in 
the Knights-Samson-King trilogy. And an ad hoc balancing test that 
instructs judges to weigh all the relevant competing interests against 
each other is an inherently subjective exercise that invites differences 
of opinion.486 
Presumably the Court devised the reasonableness-balancing model 
in Knights and returned to it in Samson and King because the Justices 
wanted to uphold the searches challenged in those cases but could not 
fit them into any established warrant exception. Unlike probation and 
parole officers, the law enforcement officials who conducted the searches 
in Knights and Samson were not acting in a supervisory capacity, and 
therefore the searches could not be justified as administrative 
inspections.487 And it is difficult to argue that a parolee or probationer 
who signs a release order has made a voluntary choice between prison 
and a search condition.488 King’s DNA sample was taken at a booking 
facility, and not as part of a search incident to arrest, and the DNA 
test was intended to solve cold cases rather than serve some special 
need divorced from ordinary criminal law enforcement.489 Faced with 
these realities, the Justices seemingly created the reasonableness-
balancing model simply to avoid invalidating the searches conducted in 
those three cases. 
Although the lack of transparency surrounding the balancing model 
makes it difficult to predict when it will resurface, it is available as a 
tool in any future case when judges need an expedient rationalization 
for a search that cannot be justified under an established warrant 
exception. Given the wealth of warrant exceptions that already exist,490 
handing courts a “go to jail free” card to play in the relatively few 
situations when they want to admit evidence that does not fall under a 
categorical warrant exception needlessly adds uncertainty to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and unfairly allows judges to manipulate 
doctrine in favor of the prosecution. As a result, the reasonableness-
balancing model should have no future: courts should continue following 
 
486. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
487. See supra notes 40–44, 52–54, 57 and accompanying text. 
488. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
489. See supra notes 65–77 and accompanying text. 
490. See Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 272, at 1666 (estimating that only 
100,000 of 8.6 million searches conducted each year are warranted searches). 
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the warrant-presumption model and suppress evidence that is seized 
without a warrant or warrant exception. 
Conclusion 
Despite the Supreme Court’s protestations that the reasonableness-
balancing model is its “general,” “ordinary,” “traditional” approach to 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,491 and the view expressed by some 
scholars that the Justices have been using a balancing approach for 
more than half a century,492 in fact United States v. Knights ushered in 
a new era in 2001. The Court’s adoption of a freewheeling balancing 
test to resolve the constitutionality of the search at issue there departed 
substantially from its prior case law. While earlier decisions had 
balanced within the framework of the warrant-presumption model, that 
balancing analysis had generally been confined to evaluating the 
permissibility of administrative inspection schemes and ruling on the 
creation and scope of categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
Not surprisingly, then, the Justices were able to find very little 
precedent to support the reasonableness-balancing model, and others’ 
efforts to supplement the Court’s work have been similarly unavailing. 
Although general language appears in a few Supreme Court opinions 
that arguably supports use of a balancing analysis outside the warrant-
presumption framework, those cases derive support for a balancing 
approach exclusively from warrant-presumption model cases, do not 
stray far from that model, or have been undermined by later case law. 
The “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment may well be reason–
ableness,493 but, until recently, that did not typically mean the 
reasonableness-balancing approach. 
On the other hand, the academic claims that the reasonableness-
balancing model has now taken center stage are likewise overblown.494 
The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the warrant-
presumption model in most of the decisions issued since 2001 and has 
even declined several invitations to use a balancing analysis to resolve 
the constitutionality of a Fourth Amendment intrusion outside the 
special needs context. 
In the wake of Knights, Samson, and King, prosecutors have fared 
well in the lower courts in cases involving DNA testing and searches of 
probationers and parolees. But the clear majority of lower court 
 
491. See supra notes 45, 55, 80 and accompanying text. 
492. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
493. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (quoting Samson v. California, 
547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006)); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 
(2001). 
494. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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opinions that resort to a balancing analysis have occurred in those 
contexts, and, with the exception of foreign intelligence and national 
security searches, the lower courts have generally been reluctant to 
expand application of the reasonableness-balancing model into new 
arenas. Moreover, some courts have been hostile to the balancing 
approach, refusing to engage in a balancing analysis, requiring the 
prosecution to satisfy both Fourth Amendment models, or weighing the 
competing interests in favor of the defendant. To paraphrase Mark 
Twain’s famous quip, reports of the death of the warrant-presumption 
model have been greatly exaggerated.495 
That is not to say, however, that the academic criticisms of the 
reasonableness-balancing model are similarly inflated.496 The balancing 
test is definitely pernicious. It is subjective, malleable, and, at least at 
the Supreme Court, overly deferential to the government. And because 
the Justices have never offered to explain why they chose to resolve 
three cases, and only three cases, using an ad hoc balancing approach, 
the Supreme Court and the lower courts can keep the balancing model 
in reserve and call it up whenever they cannot with a straight face find 
a warrant exception to justify a particular Fourth Amendment 
intrusion. 
The balancing model’s track record in the lower courts confirms 
this scholarly critique. Most of the lower court opinions that declined 
to use a balancing analysis or weighed the competing interests in favor 
of the defendant generated divisions within the court itself or with other 
courts. And the lower court cases in which defendants prevailed under 
the balancing model were, or could have been, resolved under the 
warrant-presumption model as well. Even though the reasonableness-
balancing model has not left a substantial mark on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence—at least not yet—its history in the lower courts 
evidences that the balancing approach is inherently indeterminate and 
that its only real function is to enable judges to find some excuse to 
refuse to apply the exclusionary rule despite the unavailability of an 
established warrant exception. Given the shortcomings of the 
reasonableness-balancing model, courts should continue to adhere to 
the warrant-presumption model and suppress evidence obtained during 
warrantless searches that do not fall within any of the categorical 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
 
495. See 2 Albert Bigelow Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1st 
ed. 1912) (reporting that the famous author, upon learning that his obituary 
had been mistakenly published, responded with the comment, “[j]ust say 
the report of my death has been grossly exaggerated”). 
496. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
